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TO ELECT OR NOT TO ELECT: A CASE STUDY OF
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN NEW YORK CITY 1977-2002t
Steven Zeidman*

This Article examines the process of judicial selection in New York State in light
of the recent court decisions in White and Spargo, which have paved the way
for increased campaign speech in judicial elections. Relying on empiricaldata to
comparejudicial elections and appointments in New York City between 1977 and
2002, the Article finds that elections produce a judiciary that is more beholden to
interest groups than one generated through appointments. The consequence of this
greaterspecial interest involvement is an erosion of public trust and confidence in
the judiciary. Moreover while elections arguably have increased diversity in the
New York City judiciary, elections have not achieved the same result at the statewide level. The Article concludes that New York State should abandon judicial
elections and implement a merit selection system with a diverse, non- or bipartisan nominatingcommission at its core.

A majority of all cases in the United States are decided by
judges whose continued tenure is contingent upon elections.
This fact is attributable to another: most judgeships in the
United States are elective offices. More than surprising, these
two facts are curious, even anomalous, for judges are elected
on a similar scale in no other constitutional democracy in the
world.1
[I] n thirty-nine of our fifty states, judges must face the electorate in some form, either through competitive or retention
elections. Of the' nation's more than 1200 state appellate
judges, 47% are appointed, 40% face partisan elections, and
13% face non-partisan elections. Of nearly 8500 state trial
court judges in courts of general jurisdiction, just 24% are

t

*

© 2004 by Steven Zeidman. All rights reserved.

Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law; BA 1978, State University of New York at

Albany; J.D. 1981, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful for the encouragement, support and insight of Mari Curbelo, Holly Maguigan, and Robert Mandelbaum. Christopher
Cesarani provided invaluable research and administrative assistance every step of the way. I
gratefully acknowledge as well the financial support of the Professional Development Committee at CUNY School of Law.

1.

Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: ElectiveJudiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62

U. CHI. L. REV.689, 689 (1995). See also Roy A. Schotland, FinancingJudicialElections,2000:
Change and Challenge, 2001 L. REV.M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 890 ("[N]o democracy except the
United States elects judges.").
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appointed, with 43% facing partisan elections and 33% involved in non-partisan elections
The issue of judicial selection, long of academic interest, is receiving unprecedented national attention. In December 2000,
seventeen state Chief Justices convened a National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection.3 The summit, called to discuss ways to
eliminate contentious campaign conduct during judicial elections,
resulted in a "Call to Action," concluding, inter alia, that nongovernmental monitoring groups should be established to encourage fair and ethical judicial campaigns. The next month, the
Conference of Chief Justices urged reform of judicial selection
processes across the nation and implored bar associations to do
more to encourage fair and informed judicial elections.' Several
months later, Indiana Chief Justice Randall Shepard chaired the
National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment: The Way Forward. The symposium, recommended in
the aforementioned "Call to Action," was described as "a continuation of efforts by state judicial leaders and6 others to improve the
process by which state judges are selected.,
This organized, nationwide focus on judicial elections has in
turn generated an extraordinary amount of legal writing devoted
to judicial selection issues 7 and has even spawned judicial selection
2.
Bradley A. Smith, Symposium on JudicialElections: SelectingJudges in the 21st Century,
30 CAP. U. L. Rv. 437, 437 (2002) ("A substantial majority of American judges are subject
to some type of voter election, and have been for over a century."). See also Jonathan
Lippman, ElectingJudgesShould be More Dignified, N.YL.J.,Jan. 22, 2002, at B1 (observing that
approximately 75% of New York's judges must stand for election at some point in their
judicial careers).
3.
The summit was conducted under the leadership of Texas Supreme CourtJustice
Thomas Phillips and the National Center for State Courts. It yielded several articles, published collectively in the Loyola Law Review. E.g., National Summit on ImprovingJudicial
Selection: Call to Action Statement of the National Summit on ImprovingJudicialSelection, 34 Loy.
L.A. L. R.v. 1353 (2001) [hereinafter Call to Action].
4.
Id. at 1356. The summit released a statement recommending that all states with
elected judges consider reforms in the following areas:judicial election structure, campaign
conduct, voter awareness, and campaign finance. Id.
5.
See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Justices Urge Overhaul ofJudicialRaces, THE RFCORDER,Jan. 26,
2001, at 1.
6.
Symposium, Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment, The Way Forward:
Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment, 35
IND. L. REv. 649, 650 (2002) ("Two problems shown to be acute in recent judicial elections
motivated the gathering. First, several court decisions over the last decade have limited the
scope of the ethical canons that have traditionally regulated judicial candidate conduct.
Second, unprecedented levels of participation by non-candidates in judicial campaigns
threaten the extent to which judicial elections are different from races for legislative and
executive positions.").
7.
See, e.g., Symposium, The Ethics ofJudicialSelection, 43 S. TEx. L. REv. 1 (2001); Symposium on JudicialElections: SelectingJudges in the 21st Century, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 437 (2002);
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bibliographies. 8 The mainstream news media have also generated a
spate of judicial selection articles. 9 In March 2003, the American
Bar Association (ABA) organized a colloquium to discuss the report and recommendations of its Commission on the 21st Century
Judiciary,'5 and a few months later the ABA released the report,
'Justice in Jeopardy," at the National Press Club." On a local level,
the New York County Lawyers' Association recently held a panel,
"Two Paths, One Purpose: Appointment
and Election-New York's
2
Hybrid Method ofJudicial Selection.'
New York State has been at the epicenter of this movement. In
response to the "Call to Action," the state Administrative Board
of the Courts13 adopted a resolution urging local bar associations
to create fair campaign practice committees to monitor compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct.14 In October 2001, the
Selection of StateJudges Symposium: Transcripts:Judicial Elections and CampaignFinance Reforn,
22 U. TOL. L. REv. 335 (2002); Symposium, Introduction: SelectingJudges in Pennsylvania, 106
DICK. L. REV.679 (2002);JudicialSelection Symposium, 21 Miss. C.L. Rev. 193 (2002); Symposium, Perspectives on JudicialIndependence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2003); Symposium, Selection of
State AppellateJudges, 39 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1251 (2003); Conference, Judicial Selection and
Evaluation,4 NEv. L.J. 35 (2003).
8.
See, e.g., Amy B. Atchison et al., JudicialIndependence and JudicialAccountability: A Selected Bibliography, 72 S.CAL. L. REv. 723, 723 (1999) ("This bibliography was prepared in
conjunction with the Judicial Independence and Accountability Symposium held at the
University of Southern California on November 20-21, 1998.").
9.
See, e.g.,
Editorial, Maryland's Bad Mix of Politics andJustice, WASH. POST, Aug. 11,
2002, at B8; Thomas R. Phillips, When Money Talks, The JudiciaryMust Balk, WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 2002, at B2; William Glaberson, Lawyers' Study Says States Should Pay for Court Races, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2001, at Al0; William Glaberson, States Take Steps to Rein In Excesses ofJudicial
Politicking,N.Y. TIMES,June 15, 2001, at Al.

10.
The Commission was formed in the summer of 2002 and was charged with analyzing the multifaceted problems facing state courts. The Commission's report lists twentythree recommendations, and describes state judicial systems as being in serious jeopardy. In
1999, it adopted amendments to its Model Code of Judicial Conduct addressing contribution limits and disclosure standards for candidates in judicial campaigns. That same year,
the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence established the Commission on
State Judicial Selection Standards. The ABA's House of Delegates approved the Commission's draft standards in 2000. See generally James J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the
Organized Bar in StateJudicialSelection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REv. 683
(2002).
11.
Press Release, ABA, American Bar Association To Release Landmark Report
Charting New Course For State Judicial Selection (on file with author) (calling the report
"the first attempt to break the deadlock in the debate over appointment versus election of
state judges").
12.
NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION (May 1, 2003) (flyer on file with author).
13.
The New York State Administrative Board of the Courts consists of the ChiefJudge
and the four PresidingJustices of the Appellate Division.
14.
See, e.g.,John Caher, RancorousJudicialRaces Prompt Reform, N.Y.L.J.,June 5, 2001, at
I (stating that the board also "approved an amendment to Sec. 1200.44 of the Disciplinary
Rules to state that a lawyer running for judicial office must comply with the Chief
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statewide Office of Court Administration solicited bar associations
in each of the state's 62 counties to monitor local judicial campaigns for compliance with ethical rules. 5 Soon thereafter, court
administrators and the organized bar embarked on a joint project to monitor compliance with ethics codes during judicial
elections, and the New York State Bar Association agreed to take
the lead role in coordinating a statewide effort among the local
bars.' 6 In her 2003 State of the Judiciary address, New York Chief
Judge Judith S. Kaye announced the formation of the Commis7
sion to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections.
In New York City, a series of judicial scandals in Brooklyn has
prompted great scrutiny into the role of political parties in judicial
elections.' The Brooklyn District Attorney convened a grand jury
to investigate allegations of corruption in the Democratic Party's
selection process for Supreme Court candidates in Kings County.' 9
The judicial selection reform movement has found champions in
the New York City Council ° and the State Assembly.2 More reAdministrator's Rules Governing Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR) and Canon 5 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct"); Lippman, supranote 2, at Bi, B6.
15.
SeeJohn Caher, Judicial Reform Sought: StateJoins NationalPush for Greater Civility in
Campaignsfor Bench, N.YLJ., Oct. 16, 2001, at 1.
16.
See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT, NEW YORK STATE BAR,
THE HIGH ROAD-RULES FOR CONDUCTING A JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN IN NEW YORK (2001) (on

file with author).
17.
HON. JUDITH S. KAYE, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY: CONFRONTING TODAY'S CHALLENGES (2003). The Commission was charged with "promoting confidence in judicial
elections in New York" and providing "a blueprint for preserving the dignity of judicial

elections and promoting meaningful voter participation." Press Release, Commission to
Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections (May-22, 2003) (on file with author).
18.
See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, Behind a Troubled Bench, an Arcane Way of PickingJudges, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2003, at B1; Graham Rayman, Politics and Brooklyn Bench: Judge Scandals Call
Attention to Cozy Ties with Democrats, NEWSDAY, May 12, 2003, at A03; Tom Robbins, Judicial
Fever in Brooklyn, VILLAGE VOICE, May 6, 2003, at 24.

19.

See, e.g., Nancie L. Katz, Brooklyn DA Wants Democrats' Bank Records, N.Y DAILY

NEWS, May 13, 2003, at 9.

20.
See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hicks, More Brooklyn Officials Callingfor Changes in Selecting
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at B3 (quoting Brooklyn City Council member James E.
Davis, "[rieforming the selection process for judicial candidates will go a long way in making that process fair and equitable and will help avoid even the appearance of
impropriety").
21.
N.Y. Assemblyman Roger L. Green introduced legislation, Bill A05757:
This bill creates a new title II and title III of Article 13 of the election law to reform
public financing of judicial elections, and establishes a New York State judicial election campaign fund. This bill also creates the temporary state commission to study
the existing judicial electoral processes and make recommendations regarding the
feasibility of changing the current process to a non-partisan candidate system for
judges.

Press Release, Roger L. Green, N.Y Assemblyman (May 2, 2003) (on file with author).
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cently, the Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, ventured
into the venerable Association of the Bar of the City of New York
and suggested overhauling the way judges are chosen.2
A recent decision by the United States Supreme Court has
heightened the importance and immediacy of these issues. The
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Minnesota's
"announce clause" rule, prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. 23 In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the rule was not narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling
state interest and therefore violated the First
24
Amendment.
More recently, the Federal District Court for the Northern
District of New York struck down sections of New York's Code of
Judicial Conduct as invalid prior restraints on constitutionally
protected speech and ruled that other code sections were void for
25
vagueness in Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.
In Spargo, the candidate's political activities included campaigning
for a part-time judicial position by distributing coupons for free
donuts, coffee and gas, and giving out free pizzas and cider;
speaking at a Conservative Party fundraiser; and, while acting as an
observer of the Florida recount for the Bush campaign, participating
22.
See, e.g., Graham Rayman, Mayor: Leaders Should Give Up judge Selection, NEWSDAY,
May 29, 2003, at A28. The Mayor urged that appointive systems replace judicial elections. Id.
23.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). Many states, and the
federal judiciary, have similar rules. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weighs Rule LimitingJudicialCandidates' Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A20 ("Most state supreme courts
have adopted a version of the American Bar Association's model code governing judicial
candidates' behavior, which is essentially the same as the Minnesota code."). Minnesota's
announce clause is modeled after a 1972 canon of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. In 1990, concerns about the constitutionality of the announce clause prompted the
ABA to replace it with a "commitment" clause, designed to bar "statements that commit or
appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely
to come before the court." See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, New Suits Foreseen on Judicial Elections,
NAT'L L.J.,July 8, 2002, at A9.
24.
See also Weaver v. Bonner, 309 E3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding Georgia's Code
ofJudicial Conduct to be overbroad with respect to judicial campaign speech).
25.
244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). Judge David N. Hurd found that New York
Code sections 100.1, 100.2(A), 100.5(A) (1) (c)-(g), and 100.5(A) (4) (a) were unconstitutional. The New York State Office of the Attorney General, counsel for the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, filed notice of appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit subsequently stayed Judge Hurd's order,
allowing the Commission to resume enforcement of the ethical rules thatJudge Hurd had
deemed unconstitutional. In December 2003, the Second Circuit overturned Judge Hurd's
decision on procedural, federal abstention grounds. The Court made it clear that it was not
ruling on the merits, stating, "we are sensitive to the importance of free speech issues raised
on appeal and emphasize that our decision should not be read as revealing any view on the
merits of plaintiffs' claims." Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65
(2d Cir. 2003), petitionfor cert. filed, 72 USLW 3600 (U.S. Mar. 05, 2004) (No. 03-1273).
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in a loud demonstration against the recount process. While New
York's Commission on Judicial Conduct found these activities ran
afoul of New York's Code of Judicial Conduct provisions requiring
judges and judicial candidates to avoid the appearance of
impropriety and to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, Judge
Hurd, without commenting on the propriety of Spargo's actions,
struck down the code sections relied upon. Hurd's decision makes
abundantly clear that White applies to more than just judicial
electoral activity.
Confusion reigns in the aftermath of White and Spargo. What are
the rules regarding what judges can do or say?2 6 As Gerald Stern,
former Counsel to New York's Commission on Judicial Conduct,
noted, "I am getting calls from lawyers on behalf of political clubs
and parties asking if judges are now free to say whatever they want.
...I can't even field all the calls; there are so many. The ramifications here are extraordinary and unprecedented." 7 Amid the
confusion, one thing seems clear-more open political activity and
speech during judicial campaigns is on the horizon."
26.
In an effort to provide guidance to the judiciary, the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics quickly promulgated an opinion on the impact of Spargo. The opinion
advises judges to adhere to the extant rules of the Code on Judicial Conduct until the matter is finally resolved in the appellate courts. See John Caher, OCA to Judges: Keep Following
Stricken Rules, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 24, 2003, at 1.
27.
John Caher, 'Spargo'Decision Leaves Confusion in its Wake-Scope ofJudges' Activity in
Elections Remains Unsettled, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 28, 2003, at 5. See also, John Caher, Judicial Conduct
Commission Under Fire, N.YL.J., May 8, 2003, at 1 ("[F]ewjudicial decisions have had as much
immediate and widespread impact as U.S. District Judge David N. Hurd's ruling in
[Spargo].").
28.
More questions about the scope of permissible judicial activity arise as other
judges in New York attack unfavorable findings by the New York Commission on Judicial
Conduct. As stated by the lawyer for one of those judges, "We believe the Spargo case evidences the clear trend in the law, especially since the landmark White decision last summer,
toward open political activity and open speech in judicial campaigns." Caher, supra note 27,
at 5 (quoting Timothy P. Murphy, co-counsel with the law firm representingJudge WilliamJ.
Watson). An attorney who has represented a number ofjudges before the Commission on
Judicial Conduct stated that he has "been contacted by more than two dozen jurists since
the Spargo decision was released .... ." Caher, supra note 26, at 1.
Prior to Spargo, the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct sought to remove
Lockport City Judge William Watson for remarks made during his campaign. The Commission had also censured Nassau County Supreme Court Judge Ira Raab for, inter alia,
engaging in political activity. Spargo provided new and powerful ammunition for both
judges as they argued their cases against the Commission in the Court of Appeals. While the
Commission recommended that Judge Watson be removed from the bench for making
improper campaign comments, the Court of Appeals instead decided that censure was the
appropriate sanction. In the Matter of Watson, 100 N.Y.2d 290 (2003). The Commission
eventually closed its case against Judge Raab as part of an agreement that he would resign
from the bench. Shortly after Spargo, Columbia County Supreme CourtJudge John Connor
went to District Court, before the same judge, David Hurd, who decided Spargo, to seek a
preliminary injunction to stop the Commission from pursuing allegations against him.
Judge Hurd ruled preliminarily that the Commission could proceed against Judge Connor
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The rulings in White and Spargo should not be read as endorsements of judicial elections. Though they focus, naturally, on
judicial campaigns, elections, and political activities, lurking just
barely beneath the surface is the question of whether election or
appointment is the best method by which to select judges. The
White and Spargo Courts took a deferential approach, suggesting
that if states continue the unseemly practice of electing judges,
they will have to live with the consequences.29
Given White's limits on the ability of the States to control some
aspects of judicial elections, should the States elect to live with the
consequences of judicial elections? Some are focusing on
reforming the judicial elective process. The American Bar
Association, historically a staunch supporter of merit selection,
recently again waded into the world of judicial elections. The ABA
Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, while still voicing a
preference for the nomination and appointment method,
recommended a series of election reforms. ° Faced with the
with all charges save those he struck down in Spargo. Supreme Court Justice John LaCava,
no doubt emboldened by the holdings in Spargo and White, brought a case in the Southern
District of New York seeking to have his 1999 admonition for improper political statements
vacated. Judge Colleen McMahon subsequently ruled that she lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case. LaCava v. N.Y. State Comm'n on judicial Conduct, No. 03 Civ. 2040 (CM) (Dec. 11,
2003) (Lexis 24089). It appears that these cases may represent the tip of the iceberg.
29.
See, e.g.,
Adam Liptak, Judges Mix with Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at BI
('Judge Hurd seemed to be holding his nose as he ruled. He said he had no opinion on
whetherJustice Spargo's conduct 'would bring disrespect to the judiciary.' ... [I1f NewYork
... persists in electing at least some of its judges, he implied, it will have to live with the
consequences."). Liptak noted Justice Scalia's comment during the oral argument in White:
"'Maybe you shouldn't have judicial elections,' Justice Scalia mused last spring at the argument of the White case. 'It may be a very bad idea. But as long as you have it, I don't see the
interest in keeping the electorate from being informed.'" Id. Justice O'Connor expressed
similar ambivalence in her concurring opinion in White- "Minnesota has chosen to select its
judges through contested popular elections. If the state has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the state brought on itself by continuing the practice of popularly
electing judges." Id. See also Coyle, supra note 23 (quoting Georgetown University Law Professor John Echevarria, "[Justice O'Connor] said electing judges is a fundamentally
misguided idea"); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why JudicialElections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 71
(2003) ("[A]s the dust settles on the decision in White, the Court's bottom line becomes
clear: if you don't like what judicial campaign speech does to the impartiality of elected
judges, your solution is not to curtail campaign speech. It is to end judicial elections").
Many others have recognized the Pandora's box opened by White. See, e.g., Leigh Jones,
Judge Fights Censure Citing 'Spargo,' Ira Raab Takes Challenge to Court of Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2003, at 16 (quoting an attorney for a judge fighting his case against the Commission on Judicial Conduct, "if New York is going to require judges to run in elections, then
they have to give judges the First Amendment rights that go along with that role").
30.
Preliminary Report, ABA Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, Executive
Summary ("[O]n judicial selection, the Commission states its preference for nomination
by a credible, deliberative body and appointment by the Governor.") But those states
that continue to elect judges should move to nonpartisan races, or have judges serve one
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prospects of judicial campaigns run amok and judicial activity
going unchecked, more are suggesting that State judges be
appointed by a merit selection system.
This Article examines and compares the two primary judicial selection methods-elections and merit appointment. In Part I, the
Article details the extant methods, with a particular focus on New
York State. In Part II, the Article relies on empirical data to compare the judges produced by election as opposed to merit selection
in New York City for the period 1977 through 2002. Specifically,
the Article attempts to ascertain which judges were more likely to
be disciplined for judicial misconduct and which selection method
yielded a more diverse judiciary. Statewide data for the elected judiciary is examined to complement the diversity analysis. Part II
also examines the degree of citizen participation in judicial elections by analyzing the numbers and percentages of citizens who
voted for judicial candidates in New York City. Finally, Part III outlines a model system of merit selection.
I.

METHODS OFJUDICIAL SELECTION

While federal judges are appointed by the President of the
United States with the advice and consent of the Senate, 2 state
3
judges are selected via various elective and appointive systems.
long term. Id. See also Alfini & Gable, supra note 10; Caher, supra note 15 (quoting ABA
then-president-elect A.P. Carlton, "[i]n those states where we are not going to get merit
selection, we have to figure out how to have judicial elections which will result in the

selection of ajudge who is looked upon as impartial").
31.
See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The CaseforAdopting Appointivejudicial
Selections Systems for State Courtjudges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 312 (2002) (opin-

ing in a pre-White article, "Should the court strike down Minnesota's restrictions on the
speech ofjudicial candidates, some previous advocates ofjudicial 'elections' may find that
they cannot stomach true, free judicial elections on par with the competitiveness, rhetoric,

attacks, partisanship, and promises of other political campaigns"); Tony Mauro, Rulings in
Contentions Cases Mark End of High Court Term, AM.

LAW.

MEDIA, ("[The Court's decision in

White] is definitely going to make judicial elections worse then they are now" (quoting Professor Roy Schotland of Georgtown University Law Center)). For more regarding merit
selection, see infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
32.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
33.

See, e.g., PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, AM. JUDICATURE Soc., ELECTING JUSTICE: THE

LAW AND ETHICS OFJUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

5-6 (1990) ("Several states incorporate

features from more than one system, and many employ several systems at once. Different
levels of a state's judiciary are likely to be selected in different ways-supreme court justices
under one system, for example, and trial court judges in another. Some states vary their
systems geographically, using one system for some counties or districts and another system
for others. And perhaps most important, many states use one method to make initial appointments, another to determine continuance in office, and yet a third to fill vacancies
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State judicial elective systems are of two basic types: partisan and
nonpartisan. Partisan judicial elections contain the same basic ingredients as any other type of election. Candidates may first have
to run in a primary to earn a party nomination. In the succeeding
general election,
each candidate's party affiliation is displayed on
34
the ballot.
In nonpartisan elections, "names of judicial candidates ...

ap-

pear on the ballot without party labels. There may be a primary
election, followed by a general election, but in no instance is an
individual directly identified with a political party."3 5
Appointive systems exist in various forms. Legislative appointment, whereby the state legislature controls judicial appointments,
is extremely rare. Executive appointment, whereby an elected official, typically the Governor, wields unfettered power with no
formal input from any source, is also rare. In the more common
executive appointment scheme, the Governor is given the power to
fill vacancies on an interim basis for unexpired terms.
Most appointive systems are adaptations of what is known as merit
selection. Merit selection plans typically include an independent
nominating commission that reviews and evaluates the qualifications
of candidates for vacancies and submits a list of a prescribed number
of nominees to the chief executive (i.e., Governor or Mayor). The
chief executive then selects the nominee from the list provided by
the nominating commission. The requirement that the appointment
be made from the short list provided to the appointing authority is a
distinguishing feature of a bona fide merit selection system.
A merit selection system is different from a basic "screening" system. In a "screening" system, the screening commission merely
determines whether candidates are "qualified" or "approved," and
caused by the retirement, incapacity or death of an incumbent."); Martha W. Barnett, The
1997-98 florida Constitution Revision Commission:JudicialElection or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L.
REv. 411, 412 (2000) ("A variety of methods are used to select state judges, ranging from
partisan elections to merit selection and retention. Each state has its own unique system.").
34.
See, e.g., PATRICIA A. GARCIA, ROADMAPS: JUDICIAL SELECTION 8 (1998) ("In a partisan election,judicial candidates usually run initially in a party primary to gain nomination.
Subsequently, voters participate in a general election, in which a candidate's party affiliation
is indicated on the ballot."); KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, THE SELECTION OF STATE COURT
JUDGES: REVIEW OF PRIMARY METHODS AND PRINCIPAL IMPLICATIONS,

Dec. 12, 2001, at 15

("In a partisan election system, judicial candidates and sitting judges who desire an additional term campaign for election or reelection, as the case may be, similar to any other
political candidate. There are some differences from non-judicial elections in many states,
and there are variations among the states that still employ the partisan elections method,
but the basic method is popular voting between competing candidates, with party affiliation
prominently displayed on the ballot.").
35.
Garcia, supra note 34, at 8.
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the appointing authority is then free to choose from the entire list
of qualified candidates. Screening commissions remove the unqualified candidates, while nominating commissions present only
the most qualified ones. Some plans require that the legislature
confirm the candidate selected by the appointing authority.
At the end of the judge's term there is a retention election or a
reappointment process aided increasingly by 'judicial performance
review/evaluation" devices to assist the nominating committee and
the appointing authority.3 6 Retention elections are often used in fullscale merit selection systems. Retention elections were designed as a
way to make judges accountable to the citizenry by allowing a popular vote on the performance of a judge selected via a merit system. 7
In these elections, there is no opponent and voters are asked solely
to vote "yes" or "no" whether the incumbent judge should remain
on the bench. Once again, the presence of 'judicial performance
review/evaluation" devices and/or "voters' guides3 8 to assist the voters are becoming more common.
A. JudicialSelection in New York State
Judicial selection in New York State is a hodgepodge of elections
4
and appointments. 39 Most judges in the state are elected. Su4
preme Court elections are especially unusual. ' Party leaders
organize petitions to nominate their delegates to a judicial nominating convention. The delegates, who usually run unopposed, are
elected at a primary in September. Shortly thereafter at the
nominating convention, the delegates typically ratify the party's

36.
See, e.g., A. John Pelander, Judicial PerformanceReview in Arizona: Goals, PracticalEffects
and Concerns, 30 ARiz. ST. L.J. 643 (1998) (observing that judicial performance reviews,
described as a growing trend, were intended for the self-improvement of the judge, as well
as to educate the electorate about the judge). For more regarding judicial performance
evaluation, see infra note 73.
37.
See, e.g.,
Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79 (1999); Hon. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, JudicialRetention Elections, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv.1429 (2001).

38.

See, e.g.,

SARA MATHIAS, AM. JUDICATURE

Soc.,

ELECTING JUSTICE:

A HANDBOOK

OF

JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 18 (1990); Cynthia Canary, Know Before You Go: A Case for Publicly Funded Voters'Guides, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 81 (2003).
39.
See infra p. 802 (chart of New York State judicial selection methods).
40.
See supranote 2.
41.
See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 18. The New York State Supreme Court is actually the
state's highest level trial court. The state's highest court is the Court of Appeals.
42.
See N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-124, 6-126. In fact, the New York City Board of Elections
does not even regularly keep records of the delegates' names. See Eaton, supra note 18.
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S 43
are the names that
chosen slate of judicial candidates, and those
appear on the ballot at the general election.
For courts of limited jurisdiction, New York uses a primary process
where candidates run in partisan primaries to get their party's
nomination. Candidates must obtain a specified number of petition
signatures in order to appear on the ballot for the primary."
The judicial appointment process in New York State also takes
various forms. Judges of the Court of Appeals and the New York City
Family and Criminal Courts are nominated by nominating commissions. The Commission on Judicial Nomination, created pursuant to
constitutional amendment in 1977, recommends a list of candidates
to the Governor for vacancies on the Court of Appeals." The
Mayor's Advisory Committee on the Judiciary, created by Mayoral
Executive Order in 1978, recommends a list of candidates to the
Mayor for vacancies on the New York City Family and Criminal
46

Courts.

Screening commissions assist the Governor in appointing judges
to the Appellate Division,47 the Court of Claims, and to fill interim
vacancies on the Family Court (outside New York City), Surrogate's
Court, and County Court. Judges of the Appellate Division are selected by the Governor from among the Supreme Court Justices of
the State deemed qualified by the Governor's Judicial Screening
Committee for the particular Judicial Department. 48 Judges of the
Court of Claims49 are appointed by the Governor following recommendations made by the Governor's Statewide Judicial Screening
Committee. Finally, gubernatorial interim appointments to the Family Court (outside New York City), Surrogate's Court, and County
In New York County, the Democratic Party uses a screening panel that reports up
43.
to three names for every Supreme Court vacancy, and consideration is restricted to those
names. In March 2004, the Brennan Center for Justice of New York University School of
Law filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the New York State system of electing state
Supreme Court justices is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Anthony M. DeStefano, Fedeal Lawsuit:
JudicialElection Reform Sought, NEWSDAY, March 19, 2004, at A22.
44.
N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-118, 6-136, 6-160. The political parties in some counties have
set up screening panels. The New York County Democratic Party uses a screening panel for
Civil Court vacancies, though direct ballot access is available and candidates who were not
reported out by the Party have run and won the Democratic nomination.
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
45.
46.
New York Mayor's Exec. Order No. 8, Mar. 4, 2002 (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reestablishing the Mayor's Advisory Committee on the
Judiciary). The Mayor also has the authority to appoint judges on an interim basis, as
needed, to the New York City Civil Court.
47.
The jurisdiction of the Appellate Division is outlined in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 57; N.Y.
CONST. art. 6, § 5; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 111; N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 24.
48.
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 4(c).
49.
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT.
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Court are made following recommendations by the Governor's
CountyJudicial Screening Committee for the particular county.0
NEW YORK STATE: JUDICIAL SELECTION BY COURT

COURT OF APPEALS

Candidates nominated by Commission on Judicial Nomination
Governor Appoints
Confirmed by Senate

APPELLATE DIVISION

Appointed by Governor
SUPREME

COUNTY

FAMILY

SURROGATE'S

COURT

COURT

COURT

COURT

CLAIMS

Elected

Elected

Outside NYC:
Elected

Elected

Appointed by
Governor

DISTRICT

TOWN &

COURT

VILLAGE

COURT OF

NYC: Mayor
Appoints
(See NYC
Criminal Court)
NYC

NYC

CIVIL

CRIMINAL

COURT

COURT

Elected

Candidates
nominated by
Mayors
Advisory
Comm. on
the Judiciary

CITY COURT

JUSTICE
COURTS

Elected

Elected

Elected

Mayor
Appoints

50.
See Governor's Exec. Order No. 10.1 (establishing judicial screening committees
to assist the Governor with appointments to the Appellate Division, Court of Claims, and,
on an interim basis, to the Family Court (outside New York City), Surrogate's Court, and
County Court).

SPRING

2004]

II.

To Elect or Not to Elect
COMPARISON OF ELECTED AND APPOINTED
JUDGES IN NEW YORK CITY

Beyond the selection process used, and its impact on accountability, independence, and public trust and confidence in the
judiciary, the question becomes whether there is a difference in
the nature or quality of the yield by election versus merit selection.
Supporters of an elected judiciary often try to steer the debate into
this area. This shift in focus serves to deflect the process issue and
the multitude of complaints about the role of politics, and makes
for a harder challenge for merit selection devotees-to prove that
the judges yielded by merit selection are better, let alone different,
than those yielded by election. That challenge begs the question of
how best to compare the judges produced by election and meritselection. Is there agreement as to the attributes and background
characteristics that a judge should possess? If so, then how to
evaluate and assess whether someone has the requisite qualifications? The other point of comparison concerns conduct once on
the bench. How best to measure judicial performance? What are
the yardsticks by which we can, or should, evaluate judicial behavior, and how best to conduct that assessment?
In 1992, the Fund for Modern Courts published a report on the
New York City judiciary, Characteristicsof Elected Versus Merit-Selected
New York City Judges, 1977-1992, by M. L. Henry, Jr. In that report,
Henry compared elected and merit-selected judges on the basis of
"ascriptive attributes" and "personal characteristics." 5' Henry analyzed the 369judges selected (181 elected and 188 merit-selected)
to the three entry-level New York City trial courts (Family, Criminal, and Civil) from 1977 through 1992.5' The variables Henry

51.

M. L. Henry, Jr., The Fundfor Modern Courts, in CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTED VER-

SUS MERIT-SELECTED NEW YORK CITY JUDGES, 1977-1992, at 2 (1992).

In New York City, the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary recommends judges for
52.
the Family and Criminal Courts, and the Mayor makes his/her selection from that list. The
Committee was created by Executive Order in 1978 by then-Mayor Edward I. Koch. Mayors
Dinkins, Giuliani and Bloomberg all have continued the Order, albeit with some revisions.
The Committee consists of nineteen members. The Mayor selects nine, and receives nominations for the remaining ten places: four from the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals,
two each by the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division for the First and Second Departments, and one each by the Deans of two New York City law schools. The Mayor's
approval is necessary for those nominees to become members of the Committee. The Order provides that the Mayor must fill judicial vacancies from a list of candidates submitted
by the Committee. New York City Civil Court judges are elected through a primary process.
To enter a party primary, a candidate must obtain a specified number of signatures from
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examined were age, gender, minority status, undergraduate and
legal education, prior career experience, party affiliation, elevation
to higher judicial office, and disciplinary incidents. Henry concluded that "merit selection produces a younger, more
representative, better educated, highly qualified and more politically diverse judiciary."03 Five years later, Modern Courts again
undertook a comparison of elected and merit-selected judges in
New York City, this time for the period 1992-1997."4 The study focused on gender, minority status, and party affiliation, and
concluded that "both the elective system and the appointive system
in New York City afforded women and minorities a greater opportunity to become Family, Criminal and Civil Court judges than was
the case during the fifteen year period from 1977 to 1991.,,55 The

report also noted that "women and minorities reached the bench
in somewhat greater numbers via the elective system than via appointment during the [period from 1992-19971.,,s6
It has been ten years since the Henry report and a quarter century from the first year he analyzed. Judicial elections are presently
under a microscope as observers, policy makers, and the media
grapple with increasingly contentious and costly judicial campaigns
and the meaning of White and Spargo.5 7 The time is ripe to collect
and analyze data to help inform the election versus merit selection
debate.
Again, the key question is how best to evaluate the impact that
the method of selection has on the nature and quality of the judiciary. The place to begin is by articulating the goal of judicial
selection. A pair of commentators recently suggested that the objective is to create a "qualified, inclusive and independent

members of that party. If the candidate receives a majority of the votes cast at the primary,
his or her name will appear on the ballot at the general election.
The qualifications and eligibility requirements for judges of the Family, Criminal, and
Civil Courts of New York City are identical. A candidate must be a lawyer admitted to the
Bar of New York State for a minimum of ten years; be under the age of seventy; and be a
resident of New York City. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 13, 15, 20, 25; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 124;
N.Y. CRIM. CT. ACT § 22; N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 102-a. The term of office is also the same
(ten years).
53.
Henry, supranote 51, at 16.
54.
GARY S. BROWN, THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, NEW YORK CITY BENCH BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIVERSE (1998).

55.
Id. at 5.
56.
Id.
57.
See Michael E. Solimine, The FalsePromise ofJudicialElections in Ohio, 30 CAP. L. REV.
559, 559 (2002) ("The popular press seems to be paying increasing attention to Uudicial
elections].").
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judiciary."5 8 So, the task is to compare elected versus merit-selected

judges on those variables." Which method is more likely to produce a "qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary"?
A. Qualifications

1. At Time of Appointment-Do different selection processes
yield judges with different qualifications? How can we evaluate
whether a judge is qualified? 60 How can we evaluate whether
someone possesses an amalgam of the presumably necessary
personal attributes like judicial temperament, integrity, intellect, and
industriousness? Assuming arguendo that there is agreement as to the
necessary, let alone ideal, characteristics of a judge, 61 how does one
evaluate whether someone possesses them, given that any such
evaluation will be primarily subjective? 62 One approach to
58.
See Alfini & Gable, supra note 10, at 693. The authors also note that the phrase
"qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary" is used throughout the American Bar Association's Year 2000 Standards. Id.
59.
Another scholar suggests comparing merit-selected judges with elected judges on
three dimensions: gender and racial diversity; background characteristics; and behavior on
the bench. See Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106
DICK. L. REv.729 (2002).
60.
The American Bar Association's Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary recently recommended pre-judicial training or certification programs for attorneys who aspire
to the bench. See supranote 30.
61.
Typical criteria include "integrity and moral courage, legal ability and experience,
intelligence and wisdom, and a determination of whether the candidate would be deliberate and fair-minded in reaching decisions, whether the candidate would be prompt and
industrious in performing judicial duties, whether the candidate's personal habits and outside activities are compatible with judicial office, and whether the candidate would be
courteous and considerate on the bench." Jona Goldschmidt, Selection and Retention of
Judges: Is Florida's Present System Still the Best Compromise?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 29 (1994).
The criteria suggested by the American Bar Association are integrity, legal knowledge and
ability, professional experience, judicial temperament, diligence, health, financial responsibility, and public service. SeeJAMES D. CAMERON, ABAJUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION DIVISION,
GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES FOR STATE JUDICIAL OFFICE,

Preface (1983). See also MARLA N. GREENSTEIN, AM. JUDICATURE SOC., HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 58 (1985) (listing, inter alia, the following evaluative
criteria: impartiality, industry, integrity, professional skills, community contacts, social
awareness).

62.
Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign
Speech by Candidatesfor Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REv. 207, 253 (1987) ("There are no
ready-made measures to quantify judicial temperament, impartiality, intelligence, tact, and
the other qualities that constitute judicial excellence.") (citing Mary L. Volcansek, The Effects
of Judicia-SelectionReform: What We Know and What We Do Not, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
REFORM 80 (P. Dubois ed., 1982) ("[C]omparing the quality ofjudicial personnel ... ismost
difficult in the absence of objective, quantifiable attributes of the good judge. Typically,

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:3

objectifying the evaluation of qualifications is to analyze and
compare certain identifiable and quantifiable "background
characteristics. '' 63 This approach involves looking at each judge when
s/he was appointed. What was his/her educational background,64
prior experience, or age? Does s/he bring to the bench the value of
diversity?65 Most studies comparing the inherent qualifications of
elected and merit-selected judges have found few discernable
differences.66
2. Performance on the Bench-Another approach to assessing
qualifications is to examine "behavior on the bench., 67 Here, the
focus is on qualifications as exhibited by the way judges perform
on the bench, as opposed to qualifications at the time of appointment. Essentially, we move from a prospective to an evaluative

definitions of the good judge rely on subjective factors such as personal integrity, intelligence, legal ability, and judicial temperament. These are difficult characteristics to measure
within the current methodological framework of the social sciences.")).
63.
Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 851, 860 (2002)
("Merit selection in and of itself does not generatejudges with significantly different characteristics than those judges selected by other means.").
64.
See, e.g., Victor E. Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method offudicial Selection Make? Selection Procedure in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. Sys. J. 25, 32 (1979)
("[N]o method of selection consistently selects vastly more qualified judges where quality is
measured by formal education."). But see Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems
and Judicial Characteristics:The Recruitment of State Supreme CourtJudges, 70 JUDICATURE 228,
231 (1987) (noting that merit-selected judges are slightly more likely to have attended prestigious law schools); Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 43 ("[I]t appears that merit selection
tends to produce more judges with a prestigious law background."); Henry, supra note 51.
65.
For discussion and analysis of diversity and the New York State bench, see infra
notes 79-112 and accompanying text.
66.
See, e.g., Snyder, supra note 62, at 253-54 ("Those investigators who have attempted
to compare the quality of appointed and elected judges have found no significant differences between them."); Goldschmidt, supra note 61 (noting the lack of hard evidence that
merit selection yields betterjudges); Beverly B. Cook, Should We Change Our Method of SelectingJudges?, 20JuDGESJ. 20, 22 (Fall 1981) ("[Judges] who are appointed rather than elected
do not differ in their political beliefs, intelligence, temperament, or conception of the judicial role."); Larry L. Berg et. al., The Consequences ofJudicialReform: A ComparativeAnalysis of
the California and Iowa Appellate Court Systems, 28 W. POL. Q. 263 (1975) (finding little support for the proposition that merit selected judges were more qualified than otherjudges);
Flango & Ducat, supra note 64 (noting that very few differences between judges could be
attributed to the way in which they were selected); Reddick, supra note 59, at 744 ("[T] here
are no significant, systematic differences between merit-selected judges and otherjudges.");
STUART NAGEL, COMPARING ELECTED AND APPOINTED JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (1973). But see
RICHARD A. WATSON & RdNDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR
283 (1969) (observing that members of the bar rated appointed judges better than elected
judges, and suggesting that merit plans "tend to eliminate the selection of very poor
judges").
67.
See Reddick, supra note 59. It is noteworthy that, "[h]istorically, there has been
much less emphasis placed on a judge's actual performance on the bench after selection."
Pelander, supra note 36, at 645.

SPRING

2004]

To Elect or Not to Elect

assessment. Do selected or elected judges perform better?"s How
best to evaluate judicial performance? Once again, just as it is nec-

essary to try to ascertain whether a potential judge has the
requisite personal qualities, such as integrity and intelligence, so,
too, is it necessary to try to assess whether a sitting judge has exhibited those attributes.' One can also attempt to examine judges'

performance on the bench on the basis of somewhat more objective measures such as the quantity and quality of their published
decisions, their rate of reversals from higher courts, their ability to
organize and control their docket (commonly referred to as "case
management"), and/or allegations of judicial misconduct. 70 Quite
apart from the subjective evaluation of which type of judge performs better, we might ask whether they perform differently. Do
they, for example, decide cases71differently? To date, the studies
have produced equivocal results.
68.

Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23

FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 33 (1995) ("Existing empirical work suggests that the method of selec-

tion has little, if anything, to do with the overall quality ofjudges. However, some evidence
supports the claim that judges chosen by some type of 'merit' system may perform more
competently those functions generally considered the core of a judges responsibility than
do judges chosen by other means.").
69.
The 1994 amendment to the American Judicature Society Model Provisions recommended that merit plans include Commissions on Judicial Performance to evaluate judicial
behavior on the bench. The Commissions, through a variety of devices, are to evaluate whether
a judge has exhibited, inter alia,integrity, impartiality, temperament, legal knowledge, communication skills, and effectiveness in working with other participants in the court. See AMERICAN
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, IMPLEMENTING A RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAM: MODEL LEGISLATION (OR COURT RULES), MODEL PROVISIONS, PART 4 (1994). See also Seth S. Andersen,Judicial

Retention EvaluationProgranu,34 Loy. LA L. REV. 1375 (2001).
70.
In a recent article, former Judge Penny White discusses the use of Judicial Performance Evaluations as a tool to improve the quality ofjustice and to inform the public about the
judiciary. Penny J. White, JudgingJudges: SecuringJudicialIndependence by Use ofJudicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1066 (2002). Judge White suggests using
evaluation methods such as surveys and questionnaires, courtroom observations, videotaped
proceedings, background investigations, interviews, analysis of caseload management data,
disciplinary records, and health records. The factors to analyze in determining a judge's performance on the bench include integrity, freedom from impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety, knowledge and understanding of the law, fairness, preparedness and punctuality,
diligence, communication skills, managerial skills, and public and professional service. Id. at
1071-72. See also Andersen, supra note 69 (discussing judicial evaluation and the use of surveys
(i.e., of jurors, litigants, witnesses, court staff, police and probation officers, and social service
personnel), as well as non-survey sources of information (i.e., interviewing th judge, and reviewing the judge's disciplinary record, caseload management, and record of attending
continuing legal education programs)); Alfini & Gable, supra note 10, at 704 (suggesting that
judicial performance be evaluated with respect to preparation, attentiveness, and control over
judicial proceedings; judicial management skills; courtesy to litigants, counsel and court personnel; public disciplinary sanctions; and quality ofjudicial opinions).
71.
See, e.g., Solimine, supranote 57, at n.13 ("There is a considerable academic literature
discussing how jurists picked by different systems among the American.states decide arguably
similar cases differently." (citing Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively:
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One more concrete way to measure "qualifications" is to analyze
incidents ofjudicial discipline. As one commentator noted, "Merit
selection proponents are convinced that the appointment process
yields better qualified judges. By way of proof, they claim that discipline for judicial misconduct
almost invariably involves elected,
72
not appointed judges."

a. Judicial Misconduct-Henry's 1977-1992 study examined

"public sanctions" for New York City Civil Court judges (elected)
and New York City Criminal and Family Court judges (appointed).
The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct (cJC) is
charged with investigating and adjudicating allegations of judicial
misconduct. 73 If the CJC sustains the charges, it can choose to impose one of three forms of public discipline: admonishment,
censure, or removal] 4 Henry found a higher incidence of judicial

discipline meted out against elected judges.
The View from the American States, 48 POL. REs. Q. 5 (1995)); Richard L. Hasen, "High Court
Wrongly Elected" A Public Choice Model of Judging and Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75
N.C. L. REv. 1305 (1997)); Gerald S. Gryski et. al., Models of State High Court Decisionmaking in
Sex DiscriminationCases, 48J. POL. 143 (1986); Owen G. Abbe & Paul S. Herrnson, How Judicial
Election Campaigns Have Changed, 85 JUDICATURE 286, 295 (2002) ("Judicial decision-making
research shows that in controversial cases, such as those involving capital punishment, elections
motivate justices to vote strategically in order to minimize electoral risks." (citing Melinda
Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 428 (1992));
Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections andJudicialPolitics in the American States,
23 Am.POt.. Q. 485 (1995); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case
Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics ofJudicial Choice, 59J. POL. 1206 (1997); Stephen Bright &
Pat Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 793 (1995) (finding thatjudges
were more likely to uphold the death penalty in the period just prior to judicial elections);
Ronald Schneider & Ralph Maughan, Does the Appointment ofJudges Lead to a More Conservative
Bench? The Case of California,5 JUST. Sys. J. 45, 54-55 (1979) (finding slight evidence that appointed judges are more liberal than elected judges); E Andrew Hanssen, The Effect ofJudicial
Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of StateJudges,
28J. LEGAL STUn. 205 (1999). But see Nagel, supra note 66 (finding no meaningful differences
in behavioral tendencies); Allen Lanstra, Jr., DoesJudicialSelection Method Affect Volatility?: A Comparative Study of Precedent Adherence in Elected State Supreme Courts and Appointed State Supreme
Courts,31 Sw. U. L. REv. 35 (2001) (finding no appreciable differences between elected and
appointed judges' adherence to stare decisis); Snyder, supranote 62, at 259 ("Studies ofjudicial

decision have discerned no significant differences between judges chosen by appointment and
those chosen by election."); Burton M. Atkins & Henry R. Glick, FormalJudicialRecruitment and
State Supreme Court Decisions, 2 AM. POL. Q. 427 (1974); Flango & Ducat, supra note 64, at 39;
Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 44 (noting that studies fail to provide evidence of a correlation
between selection method and decisionmaking).
72.
Judith L. Maute, SelectingJustice in State Courts; The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S.
TEX. L. REv. 1197, 1225--26 (2000) (citing an October 11, 1999 telephone conversation with
Harold Conyers, Oklahoma State Court Administrator).
73.

N.Y. CONSOL. LAws ch. 30, art. 2-A.

74.
"The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct is the disciplinary agency
designated by the State Constitution to review complaints of misconduct against judges of the
State Unified Court System." New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 2002 Annual
Report. "The Commission has the authority to receive and review written complaints of
misconduct against judges, initiate complaints on its own motion, conduct investigations, file
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NYC

ELECTED V. MERIT SELECTED JUDGES

DISCIPLINED FOR MISCONDUCT

1977-1992

(n=9)

o Elected
E Medt

Elected
87%

A review of CJC data for 1992-2002 reveals that elected judges
again far surpass their appointed colleagues in incidents ofjudicial
discipline.
NYC

ELECTED V. MERIT SELECTED JUDGES

DISCIPLINED FOR MISCONDUCT 1992-2002

(n=16)

o0 Elected
E Merit
Elected
75%

Formal Written Complaints and conduct formal hearings thereon, subpoena witnesses and
documents, and make appropriate determinations as to dismissing complaints or disciplining
judges within the state unified court system. The authority is derived from Article 6, Section 22,
of the Constitution of the State of New York, and Article 2-A of the Judiciary Law of the State of
New York." Id.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 37:3

An examination of "private discipline" for the same ten-year period reveals similar findings. The CJC issues "letters of caution"
when it determines that misconduct is established but is not of the
sort that warrants public discipline.75 There were sixteen letters of
caution sent to New York City judges in the period 1992-2002.
Twelve, or 75%, were sent to Civil Court judges. The overall
twenty-five-year picture reveals that elected judges were substantially more likely to be disciplined for judicial misconduct than
their appointed counterparts.76 These findings are consistent with
the results of similar studies in other jurisdictions.77 To many, these
results will come as no surprise given that in one of the seminal
studies of judicial selection, researchers found that merit selection
yielded fewer "very poor" judges. 7s From that finding, one can extrapolate that "very poor" judges may well be more likely to be the
subjects ofjudicial discipline.
NYC ELECTED

V. MERIT SELECTED JUDGES

DISCIPLINED FOR MISCONDUCT 1977-2002

(n=25)

Merit
20%

~[

Elected
*Merit
Elected
.80%

75.
"A Letter of Caution is a ...communication to ajudge upon conclusion of a formal
disciplinary proceeding and a finding that the judge's misconduct is established .... Where
the Commission determines that ajudge's conduct does not warrant public discipline, it will

issue a cautionary letter, privately calling the judge's attention to ethical violations that
should be avoided in the future." Id. at 19.
76.
In raw numbers, from 1977-2002, 268 judges were appointed and 314 were
elected.

77.
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 33, at 423 (observing that elected judges comprised
the overwhelming majority of judges disciplined by the Florida Judicial Qualifications
Commission).

78.

Watson & Downing, supra note 66, at 283.
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B. Inclusiveness
While diversity also relates to whether a judge is "qualified," it
encompasses directly what the variable of "inclusiveness" is intended to measure. Which system does more to promote a diverse
judiciary? We begin with the proposition that the judiciary should
be diverse. 9 As stated succinctly by H. T. Smith, then-President of
the National Bar Association, 'Judicial diversity is more important
today than ever."s° Several studies have shown that merit selection
may increase the diversity of the bench."' What about the New York
79.
See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges:RacialDiversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95 (1997); Archibald R. Murray, The Road to the
Judiciary:Navigating the JudicialSelection Process, 57 ALB.L. REV. 973, 974 (1994) (citing New
York State Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye highlighting the importance of diversity within the
judiciary); Luke Bierman, Preserving Power-in Picking Judges: Merit Selection for the New York
Court of Appeals, 60 ALB.L. REv. 339 (1996) (alluding to the many pronouncements by New
York Governor Mario M. Cuomo about his objectives to enhance the diversity of the Court
of Appeals); Nancy J. King, Batsonfor the Bench? Regulating the Peremptory Challenges ofJudges,
73 CH.-KENT L. REV. 509 (1998) (referring to a finding in 5 Report of the NewYork State
Judicial Commission on Minorities: Appendix-Staff Reports and Working Papers 28
(1991) that 53% of white judges and 99% of minority judges stated that diversity was an
important factor with respect to judicial selection). The ABA Commission on the 21st Century judiciary recently issued a series of recommendations, including that steps be taken to
increase the number of minority judges to mirror more accurately their percentage of the
population. See supra note 30. See also Patricia Manson, Judiciary Pushed to 'Brink of Crisis,'
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 14, 2003, at 1.
80. H. T. Smith, Toward a More Diverse Judiciary, ABA JOURNAL (July 1995). See also
Carol DeMare, Bar Looks for Diversity on Bench, THE TIMES UNION, Aug. 29, 2002, at B3, ("[i]f
we are to bolster public trust and confidence in the justice system, then those who use the
courts need to be able to look up at the bench and see ajudiciary that reflects gender diversity and the wonderful mosaic of ethnic and racial groups that exist in the urban centers,
suburbs, and villages of New York.") (quoting New York State Bar Association President
Lorraine Power Tharp); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on
State and FederalBenches, 1985 and 1999,85JUDIcATuRE 84, 85 (2001) (arguing that diversity
on the bench maintains and increases the legitimacy of the nation's judicial tribunals).
81.
Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Arkansas Courts: Observations on the Wyoming Experience
with Merit Selection ofJudges: A ModelforArkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281 (1995)
(advocating merit selection as the best way to enhance judicial diversity); Barnett, supra note
33, at 419 ("Merit selection and retention ...are viewed as a better way to facilitate the
addition of minorities and women to the bench."); Bierman, supra note 63, at 856 ("Merit
selection may also increase diversity on the bench ....Merit selection, focusing more on
qualifications than on political alliances, would permit nontraditional candidates for the
bench to stand on their own achievements."); GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE
199os,

THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION

ON GOVERNMENT

at 296 n.70 (Bruce A. Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT ETHICS
REFORM] ("[T]o the extent statistical evidence exists, it supports the proposition that, in
New York and across the nation, appointive processes attract a more diverse pool ofjudicial
candidates than do elective processes." (citing witness testimony at public hearings));
Garcia, supra note 34, at 16; Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 41 ("[W]hen coupled with the
trend to require that nominating commissions take diversity on the bench into account
INTEGRITY,
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City judiciary? Henry compared the diversity of the judiciary produced via appointment (Family and Criminal Courts) with that
produced by election (Civil Court). The tables below include
Henry's data from 1977-1991, new data for 1992-2002, and the
full twenty-five year picture from 1977-2002.
DIVERSITY AND THE APPOINTED

& ELECTED NEW YORK

CITY

JUDICIARY (NEW YORK CIVIL COURT, CRIMINAL
COURT

&

FAMILY COURT)

1977-1991

Appointed New York City
Family & Criminal Court Judges
(188)
Men
130(69%)
Women
58 (31%)
Appointed New York City
Family & Criminal Court Judges
(188)
African American
28 (15%)
Latino
12 (6%)
Asian
1 (.5%)
Overall
41(22%)

Elected New York City
Civil Court Judges
(181)
Men
Women

134(74%)
47 (26%)

Elected New York City
Civil Court Judges
(181)
African American
29 (16%)
Latino
5 (3%)
Asian
2(1%)
Overall
36 (20%)

1992-2002

Appointed New York City
Family & Criminal Court Judges
(80)
Men
47 (59%)
Women
33 (41%)
Appointed New York City
Family & Criminal Court Judges
(80)
African American
11(14%)
Latino
10(13%)
Asian
3(4%)
Overall

24 (30%)

Elected New York City
Civil Court Judges
(133)
Men
66 (50%)
Women
67 (50%)
Elected New York City
Civil Court Judges
(133)
African American
32 (24%)
Latino
20(15%)
Asian
1 (.1%)
Other
1(.1%)
Overall
54 (41%)

when making their nominations, it is likely that far greater numbers of minority and women
judges will take the bench under a merit plan then ever before."); Madison B. McClellan,
Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reformer's Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in
Florida,43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 550 (1986);. But see Maute, supra note 72 (stating that data on

the diversity effects of merit selection is equivocal).
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Appointed New York City
Family &Criminal Court Judges
(268)
Men
177 (66%)
Women
91(34%)
Appointed New York City
Family &Criminal Court Judges
(268)
African American
39(15%)
Latino
22 (8%)
Asian
4(1.5%)
Overall

65 (24%)

Elected New York City
Civil Court Judges
(314)
Men
200 (64%)
Women
114 (36%)
Elected New York City
Civil Court Judges
(314)
African American
61 (19%)
Latino
25 (8%)
Asian
3(1%)
Other
1(.3%)
Overall
90 (29%)

An examination of the past quarter century of judicial selection
in New York City (1977-2002) reveals that election and appointment yielded comparable numbers of women judges (36% and
34%). Elections produced a more racially diverse judiciary (29%
versus 24%), with the difference being the greater number of
elected African American judges (19% versus 15%).
More telling, though, are the numbers for the immediate past
decade. While the number of appointed judges who were women
increased from 31%, during the period 1977-1991, to 41%, during
1992-2002, women comprised 50% of the elected judges, a number more nearly resembling the percentage of women in the New
York City population. The racial diversity data paints a similar picture. While the appointed judiciary increased from 22% to 30%
people of color, the elected judiciary increased from 20% to 41%.
Once again, the most significant difference is with respect to African
Americans. While the number of African American appointed
judges remained constant from 1977-1991 and 1992-2002 (15%
and 14%), the number of elected African Americans rose from
16% to 24%.
It remains the case that New York City's judiciary does not
mirror the population it serves. Although the 41% elected judges
of color is significantly higher than the 30% appointed judges, it
certainly does not reflect the New York City population, which,
according to the most recent census, is estimated to be 64%

82.
According to the United States Census 2000, 53% of New York City residents are
women.
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people of color. Most striking is the absence of Asian judges,
elected or appointed, on the New York City bench. While Asians
make up 10% of New York City's population," only three of the
314 judges elected to the bench in the past twenty-five years, and
only four of the 268 appointed judges, were Asian. On the face of
it, it appears that elections promote a more diverse judiciary. Yet,
putting on hold the myriad problems associated with elections
generally,8 5 the diversity variable must be more fully analyzed. What
is the picture for the entire state?
A review of statewide data reveals that, outside of New York
s
City,86 the New York judiciary profoundly lacks diversity.1
According to data from the New York State Office of Court
Administration (OCA) for August 2002, the state's 1,233judges are
87% white and 13% minority.8 s Yet, the United States 2000 Census
reports that minorities comprise 37% of the New York State population (African American 16%, Latino 15%, and Asian 6%). The
OCA data further reflects that 26% of the state's judges are
women. 9 The United States Census 2000 reports that women
comprise 52% of the New York State population.

83.
84.
85.

United States Census 2000.
Id.
See infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text for discussion of the problems en-

demic to judicial elections.

86.
Many have noted that the extent to which the New York State judiciary is at all diverse is almost entirely a function of the New York City judiciary. See, e.g., DeMare, supra
note 80, at B3 ("[The] majority of women and minority judges are found in New York
City."); Tom Perrotta, Inequalitiesfor Women Judges Outside City Remain, Report Says, N.YL.J.,
July 29, 2002, at 1.
87.
See, e.g., Murray, supra note 79, at 987 ("As ofJanuary 29, 1992, New York State did
not have a female judge in the 4th, 6th or 7th Judicial Districts, encompassing almost thirty
counties. It has changed. We now have one woman in the 3rdJudicial District. We now have
one woman in the 5th Judicial District."); Perrotta, supra note 86 ("Though the role of
women in the courts has increased markedly in the last 15 years, there are still glaring inequalities, such as the lack of women judges outside of New York City, according to a new
report by the New York State Committee on Women in the Courts."). Regarding the lack of
Latino representation on the bench, see, for example, Tom Perrotta, Study: New York is
Among Worst in Appointing Hispanics to Bench, N.YL.J, March 19, 2002, at 1; Tom Perrotta,
Second Department Gets First Hispanic, N.YL.J.,June 12, 2002, at 1. A gubernatorial task force
concluded in 1992 that New York's judicial election process resulted in the election of disproportionately few minority judges. See, e.g., Gary Spencer, JudicialElection Reforms Urged;
Governor's Task Force Seeks to Add More Minorities, Women, N.YL.J., February 13, 1992, at 1.
More than a decade later, the lack of women and minority judges compelled the New York
State Bar Association to create the Task Force on Increasing Diversity in the Judiciary. See
DeMare, supra note 80.
88.

NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, MINORITY PARTICIPATION

AMONG MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL WORKFORCE (1996-2002) [hereinafter MINORITY PARTICIPATION] (on file with author).
89.
If New York City Civil, Criminal, and Family Courts are removed from the equation, the percentage of women judges drops to 20%. Id.
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As recently as 1992, the Governor's Task Force on Judicial
Diversity found that only 12% of state Supreme Court justices were
women and that there was not a single woman Supreme Court
justice in four of the state's twelve judicial districts. 90 The Task Force
also observed a complete absence of judges of color in many
counties that had large African American, Latino, and Asian
populations. 91
A decade later the judiciary is in some respects more closely beginning to resemble the population it serves, but there is still a
long way to go. A recent study by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense
and Education Fund revealed that "New York State had the lowest
percentage of Hispanic state court judges-1.6 percent-among
states with the 10 largest Hispanic populations as of 2000.92
The situation with respect to women judges is similar-it has
improved but does not nearly mirror the percentage of women in
the population. A 2002 report, "Women in the Courts: A Work in
Progress," by the New York State Committee on Women in the
Courts, found widespread lack of female representation on the
bench. More specifically, the report found no women elected to
the state Supreme Court in the 4th judicial district from 19982001, only one woman currently elected to the state Supreme
Court in the 3d judicial district, and only three women among the
thirty-two Supreme Court justices in the 9th judicial district.93 In

August 2002, the New York State Bar Association created the Task
Force on Increasing Diversity in the Judiciary to improve gender,
racial, and ethnic diversity on the bench at all levels. The Task
Force was formed, in part, to address the chronic underrepresentation of women and minorities on the state Supreme Court,94
Surrogate's Court, Family Court, and County Court. 95 Even more
90.
See Spencer, supra note 87.
91.
Id. (referring to Richmond, Orange, Monroe and Erie counties).
92.
Perrotta, supra note 87. See also, Carlos G. Ortiz, Put More Hispanics on Appellate
Court, N.Y.LJ., April 26, 2001, at 2 (noting that Hispanics number almost three million people in New York State, approximately 15% of the population, yet none of the fifty-seven
judges of the Appellate Division, and only two of the more than sixty Court of Claims
judges, were Hispanic). In March 2002, Governor Pataki appointed a Latino to the Appellate Division, First Department, and in June 2002, he appointed the first Latinojudge to the
Appellate Division, Second Department. Id.
93.
See Perrotta, supra note 86.
94.
At the time the formation of the Task Force was announced, minorities comprised
14% of the 315 state Supreme Court justices, and women made up 17%.
95.
At that time, "only 18% of the state's Surrogate's Courtjudges, approximately onethird of Family Court judges outside the city of New York, and 9 percent of all County Court
judges [were] women." NY State Bar Association Forms Task Force to Study Diversity on the Bench,
DAILY RECORD, September 3, 2002.
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recently, New York State Bar Association President Lorraine Power
Tharp noted that while the situation had improved, "there were
96
still 28 (of 62) counties that had no women judges."
The Franklin H. Williams Judicial Commission on Minorities
(Commission) was created in 1988, in part "to review the selection
processes for elected and appointed Judges to determine which
processes resulted in greater minority representation on the
bench." 97 The Commission's 2000 Annual Report contains statewide data concerning minority representation on the bench.
New York's Supreme Court is the state's highest level trial court.
Only justices of the Supreme Court are eligible for appointment to
the Appellate Division.98 Of the state's 344 Supreme Court justices,
291 (84.6%) are white and 52 (15.1%) are minority.99 If New York
City Supreme Court justices are removed from the equation, the
white majority becomes 87.5%.'0° The most recent census reports
that minorities comprise 37% of New York State's population (16%
Black; 15% Latino; and 6% Asian). The numbers are even starker
for Surrogate's Court./°1 All 22 of the state's elected Surrogates are
white.
An examination of other statewide elected judicial offices reveals an even deeper racial divide. The following elected courts all
exist outside New York City. The data plainly reveals an astonishing
lack of minority presence on the bench.
COURT

TOTAL

WHITE

MINORITY

102(94.4%)

0

JUDGES

County

108

Court 1"s
96.

MISSING
DATA

6

Nora Jones, 'How to Become a Judge' Focus of All Day Event, DAILY RECORD, January

22, 2003.

97.
PORT

THE FRANKLIN

H.

WILLIAMS JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, ANNUAL

RE-

3 (2000).

98.

N.Y. Const. Art. 6, § 4(c).

99.
The Commission on Minorities report states that it was "missing data" for one
judge. FRANKLIN N. WILLIAMS JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORITIES, Supra note 97, at 1.
100. In 2002, the New York City Supreme Court consisted of 48 judges, of whom 31
were white (66%) and 16 were minority (34%) (one judge was listed as "race/ethnicity
unknown"). Of the 16 minority judges, 11 were African American and 5 were Latino. Once
again the lack of Asian judges in New York City, as well as in New York State, is striking. See
MINORITY PARTICIPATION,

supra note 88.

101. Surrogate's Court handles matters involving the affairs of decedents, including the
probate of wills and the administration of estates. See N.Y. Consol. Laws ch. 30, arts. 6, 6A;
N.Y. Sur. Ct. Procedure Act § 201 (3).
102. Includes judges who sit only in County Court and judges who combine service on
the County Court with service on the Family and/or Surrogate's Court. The County Court
exists in all counties outside New York City. The Court has original jurisdiction for criminal
and civil cases (up to $25,000). See N.Y. Consol. Laws ch. 30, arts. 6A, 7.
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District

MISSING

WHITE

MINORITY

44

38 (86.4%)

2 (4.5%)

4

154
64

140 (90.9%)
56(87.5%)

1(1%)
2 (3.1%)

13
6

TOTAL

DATA

JUDGES
Court"_

City Court,'
Family Court'0

The evidence is abundantly clear. When examined on a statewide basis, elections produce a disproportionately white judiciary.
Yet merit selection is opposed by many minority organizations.1
The primary objection is that merit selection cedes power to elitist
white male lawyers to appoint other elitist white male lawyers to
the bench.0 7 Many hold out the predominantly white federal
bench as an example of what is wrong with appointive judicial systems.'0 0 In New York State, one can cite to the composition of the
Court of Claims and Appellate Division, as well as those judges appointed as Acting Supreme Court justices, as evidence that
appointed judiciaries fail to promote diversity.' Yet, none of those

103. The District Court exists in Nassau County and the western part of Suffolk County.
The Court has original jurisdiction for criminal (misdemeanors and lesser offenses) and
civil (up to $15,000) cases. See UNIFoRM DISTRICT CT. ACT.
104. Includes City Court judges, Acting City CourtJudges, and ChiefJudges of the City
Courts. The City Court exists in 61 cities outside New York City. The Court has original
jurisdiction for criminal (misdemeanors and lesser offenses) and civil (up to $15,000) cases.
See id.
105. Outside of New York City, judges of the Family Court are elected. See FAMILY CT.
ACT.
106. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 34, at 15 ("Traditionally, one of the most vocal segments
of the population questioning or even opposing use of a merit selection process have been
minority organizations. Representatives of minorities and women have expressed concerns
that a merit selection system may exclude those groups from the bench, or diminish their
chances of filling those seats."); Barnett, supra note 33, at 419 ("Merit selection and retention, however, are viewed as a better way to facilitate the addition of minorities and women
to the bench. Yet, minority organizations have often opposed the creation of such systems."); Malia Reddick, JudicialReform in New York: From Elections to Merit Selection 14 (2003)
(unpublished draft, on file with author) (noting the NAACP's opposition to merit selection
during New York's court reform efforts of the late 1970s over concerns that merit selection
would lead to fewer minorityjudges).
107. See, e.g., William C. Thompson, Perspective, Open Letter to the Black & Puerto Rican
Caucus: The Fraud of'Merit Selection, N.YL.J.,June 24, 1993, at 2.
108. See, e.g., Tom McCann, Cook County Makes Real Strides in Diversifying Bench, CHI.
LAw., July 2003, at 14 (observing that the federal judiciary is only 7.5% African American
and 3.2% Hispanic); Editorial, More Black Magistrates, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 15,
2002, at B6 (noting that fewer than 5% of federal magistrate judges are African American).
109. Under Article 6, § 26 of the State Constitution, the Office of Court Administration
is empowered to designate certain classes of judges as Acting Supreme Court Justices. Of
the 137 Acting Supreme Court justices in New York City, only 16 (11.7%) are minority. See
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appointments are made pursuant to a true merit selection system.
The Governor utilizes a screening commission with respect to the
Court of Claims and the Appellate Division," ° and judges are designated as Acting Supreme Court justices pursuant to the Office of
Court Administration and the Chief Administrative Judge."' These
are not ideal merit selection processes because they lack diverse
nominating commissions, charged with finding a diverse slate of
candidates, and the appointing authorities are not limited to making a selection from the list produced by the committee.12 While it

appears at first glance that elections may be the path to a diverse
judiciary, the evidence shows that elections held outside of New
York City do not yield a diverse pool of judges. In any event, elections still carry the trappings of political campaigns: party politics,
fundraising, and other associated evils.
C. Independence
Focusing next on the "independent" variable, that is, which selection method produces a more independent judiciary, returns us
to the "process" question. An independent judiciary is the "citadel
of the public justice and the public security,"'3 and one way to furtherjudicial independence is to remove politics from the equation
to the greatest extent possible.1 4 How to measure judicial independence? It is generally accepted that, by and large, merit
selection is aimed at enhancing judicial independence, while
elec5
tions are geared toward promoting judicial accountability.1
1. Voting Behavior-If elections do not yield greater diversity
or more qualified judges, why continue to elect? It is an especially
timely question in light of White and the prospect of judicial elections and political activity run amok. The primary. reason proffered
supra note 88. See also,Juan Gonzalez, A Supreme Example of Ethnic
Bias, DAILY NEws,Jan. 14, 2000, at A3.
110. For a discussion of screening versus nominating commissions, see supra text at pp.
9-10.
111. SeeN.Y. CONST. Art. 6, § 26.
112. For more regarding a model merit selection process, see infra notes 194-205 and
accompanying text.
MINORITY PARTICIPATION,

113. THE FEDERALIST No: 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
114. "The most appealing characteristic of... a merit selection plan is that politics are
almost completely removed from the judicial selection process." Glenn C. Noe, Alabama

JudicialSelection Reform: A Skunk in Tort Hell, 28 CUMB. L. REV.215, 241 (1998).
115. Barnett, supra note 33, at 413 ("Appointive-based methods are seen as fostering
more judicial independence, while elections are credited with holding a judiciary more
accountable to the electorate.").
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in support of judicial elections is democracy-give the citizens a
voice and make the judiciary accountable to them. Supposedly,
judicial elections, like any other elections, foster democratic values
as citizen input leads to an accountable, responsive, and representative judiciary. The judiciary, however, is different from the executive
or legislative branches; the need for judicial independence trumps
other considerations. "' J]udges are not representatives. Theirjob is
to interpret the law and the Constitution.""'6 "Members of the judicial branch ... are not direct representatives of the people, but' are
"1 7

expected to act as impartial arbiters of cases and controversies."
The democracy rationale for judicial elections is weakened by an
examination of actual voting practice in judicial elections. "Among
the goals of a rational system ofjudicial elections (indeed, of elections for any public office) would be to have the highest possible
participation of the voting public, to give those voters a choice for
any particular elective position, and to make it competitive.
Those who support judicial elections on the accountability, democracy basis would no doubt agree that voting makes sense only
when voters have knowledge about the candidates, voters have
choices, and voters participate. Judicial elections are lacking on all
these measures.119
a. Knowledge-To get out their message, to educate the
electorate, judges must campaign. In order to campaign, they need
money, lots of money. As one judicial selection scholar observed,
"The cost of judicial] campaigns has been doubling almost every
biennium so that judicial candidates in several states are regularly
spending

millions.' '

20

To get money, they must raise funds.

Fundraising itself threatens judicial independence.12 ' Judges may
well become beholden to the interest groups and individuals who

116. J. Andrew Crompton, Pennsylvanians Should Adopt a Merit Selection System for State
Appellate CourtJudges, 106 DICK. L. REV. 755, 757 (2002) (quoting then Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, who now serves as the United States Secretary of Homeland Security).
117. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 287.
118. Solimine, supranote 57, at 560.
119. Geyh, supra note 29, at 76 ("U]udicial elections promote accountability so poorly
that the minimal gains they engender on that score are offset by the losses to independence
they cause.").
120. Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest
State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 79, 112 (1998). See also William Glaberson, supra
note 9 (explaining that the campaign for the Ohio Supreme Court cost an estimated $9
million, and the race for three Supreme Court seats in Michigan topped $16 million).
121. See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, andJudicialDecisions: A Case Study of Arbitration
Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 583 (2002) (finding that judges on Alabama's Supreme
Court voted in accordance with the views of their campaign contributors).
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contribute to their campaigns. 2 Those who contribute-lawyers
and special interest groups-often have a stake in cases and issues
that the prospective judge must later decide.123 More and more,
special interest groups pour large sums of money into judicial
campaigns, to elect judges who will decide cases favorably to their
economic interests." 4 Even if this was not a widespread
phenomenon, the mere appearance of such impropriety 1has
a
5
corrosive effect on public trust and confidence in the courts.
The codes of judicial conduct have prevented judges from saying anything that might provide information for a voter to utilize
when making a voting decision. In particular, candidates were
prohibited from stating their views on disputed legal or political
issues. Although these rules left voters with little to go on when
casting votes for judges, they were motivated by the principle that
judges should decide cases based upon the facts presented to
them, as opposed to based on predispositions or preconceived

122. GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 287 ("Another threat to judicial
independence is posed by the imperative to raise money in election races, which may compel judges to depend upon outside contributors."); Carrington, supra note 120 (suggesting
the likelihood that large campaign contributors expect some sort of quid pro quo from the
judge once on the bench).
123. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 33, at 417-18 ("More often, however, attorneys and law
firms are the ones that contribute to judicial elections."); Behrens & Silverman, supra note
31, at 279 ("A large portion of donations to judicial campaigns is contributed by parties and
lawyers with cases before the court."); Susan E. Liontas, JudicialElections Have No Winners, 20
STET. L. REV. 309, 311-14 (1990); Peter A. Joy, A Professionalism Creed for Judges: Leading By
Example, 52 S.C. L. REv. 667, 673 (2001).
124. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, JudicialElections and JudicialIndependence, The Voter's Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 32 (2003) (noting that interest groups with economic stakes in
the courts' decisions are the primary source of the growth in judicial campaign spending);
Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups andJudicialElections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1391, 13981400 (2001); Maute, supranote 72, at 1205. See also Sean Reilly, Doin' the Bench Shuffle, ABA
J., Nov. 1999, at 26 (detailing how business leaders in Alabama and Texas financed efforts to
recruit and elect judges they perceived as "sympathetic").
125. See, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THEJUSTICE SYSTEM,
May 1999, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPublicView
CrtsPub.pdf (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter PUBLIC
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE SURVEY] 78% agreed with a statement saying that elected judges are
influenced by having to raise campaign funds. The survey was designed by the National Center for State Courts and funded by the Hearst Corp. The poll was conducted by Indiana
Public Opinion Lab at Indiana University based on interviews with 1,200 randomly selected
adults. Id. See also Tillman J. Finley, Note, JudicialSelection in Alaska: Justifications andProposed
Courses of Reform, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 49, 58 (2003); Geyh, supra note 29, at 54 (regarding
polls in Ohio, Texas, and Pennsylvania showing that the public believes judges' decisions
are influenced by campaign contributions); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 275-76
("[S]urveys consistently show that an overwhelming majority of the public believe that many
state courts are influenced by money and politics."); 76% of voters believe that campaign
contributions have some influence on judges' decisions. JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN VOTERS AND STATEJUDGES, October 2001-January 2002.
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ideas.12 6 After White, to the extent that judicial candidates can "announce" their views, the goals of nonpartisanship and impartiality
are threatened. The tone of judicial campaigns is getting nastier as
well. 127 Unseemly campaign conduct is becoming the norm as judicial elections become fraught with all the trappings of any modern
day campaign/election.
Given the limits on what judicial candidates can say, 128 voters
know virtually nothing about the candidates, 23 and end up, if they
even bother to pull a lever, merely voting for a party label, familiar
name, or ethnicity.3 0 The bottom line is that most voters do 3not
even know the candidates' names, let alone their backgrounds.1'
b. Choice-The "choice," such as it is, is made not in the voting
booth, but in the nomination or primary process. 3 2 Party bosses
and/or party loyalists determine the "choice" for each party, and
more often than not, that is the end of it. The predominant party
126. Behrens & Silverman, supranote 31.
127. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 124, at 34 ("[U]ndoubtedly the decision will increase
the frequency with which candidates state explicitly how they stand on issues. In the process,
it will facilitate issue-based attacks on incumbents by challengers."); Carrington, supra note
120, at 112 (regarding the use of "spot advertising on commercial television prepared by
highly paid craftsmen skilled in the art of disparaging public persons").
128. These limits are changing, though likely for the worse in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in White. See generally Katherine Moerke, Must More Speech be the
Solution to Harmful SpeechJudicialElections After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 48
S.D. L. REv. 262 (2003); Cathy R. Silak & Aaron C. Charrier, The Future ofJudicialElections: A
Campaign Conduct Commission Proposal, 39 IDAHo L. REV. 357 (2003); Leigh A. Leonard,
Note, In the Aftermath of Republican Party v. White, StateJudicial Candidates are Uncertainas to
What Remains Protected,53 CATH. U.L. REV. 267 (2003).
129. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 57, at 562 ("[M]any studies over the years demonstrate one commonality: no matter what form of judicial election, most voters in most
elections are largely uninformed about the persons running for these offices."); McFadden,
supra note 33, at 10 ("Public opinion surveys have shown that voters possess little specific
knowledge about judicial candidates and campaign issues." (citingJohnson et al., Salience of
JudicialCandidatesand Elections, 59 Soc. Set. Q. 371 (1978)); Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at
13-14 ("[1It is common knowledge that the public is uninformed about judicial candidates."). Not only do voters know very little about the judicial candidates, they usually are
even unaware of who is running. See, e.g., Crompton, supra note 116, at 756 ("[P]olls
strongly suggest that most voters have little idea who is running for statewide judgeships.").
130. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 14.
131. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 124, at 20 ("[S]urveys often show that high proportions
of voters cannot recall the names ofjudicial candidates around the time of the election.");
Roy Schotland, ElectiveJudges' Campaign Financing:Are StateJudges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes
of American Democracy?, 2J. L. & POL. 57, 86-87 (1985). Voters in judicial elections cannot
remember the name of the person they voted for, even shortly after the election. See, e.g.,
How Much Do Voters Know or Care About Judicial Candidates?, 38 JUDICATURE 141 (1955);
Charles A. Johnson et al., The Salience ofJudicial Candidates and Elections, 59 Soc. Scl. Q. 371
(1978).
132. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 49 ("Judges are usually not really elected,
but are designated by the leaders of the party political machine dominant in the district.").
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wins the election. 33 Party leaders, not the voting public, make the
choice, and they base their choices on inappropriate considerations (i.e., personal service to a politically important local club or
to the county organization), as opposed to qualifications. 34 The
power to influence who ends up on the ballot provides party leaders with ample opportunities for political patronage. The key, as
noted by New York State's Chief Administrative Judge,
is to get an
35
elected legislature to support an appointed judiciary.
Typically, candidates run in unopposed, uncontested races. Even
where there is some possibility of a "race," the prevalence of "crossendorsements" rears its head.

36

As noted at the conclusion of a

lengthy study of judicial selection in New York, "We must stop perpetuating the myth thatjudicial elections have anything to do with
democratic choice. They do not and they cannot."'37
c. Participation-Votersdon't know anything about their judicial candidates, and not surprisingly, they don't vote. 3 In fact,
voter interest, as well as knowledge, is low. 3 9 A large percentage of

citizens who vote for the candidates at the top of the ballot (i.e.,
President, Governor, etc.) decline to cast a vote for any of the
other races; this effect is known as "roll-off."'" The roll-off effect is
133. "I'm against elected judges because the way you get elected is the way they do it in
the Bronx. You get three political leaders together, boom, they pick a guy and he's the
judge, he's elected." RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST: A BLUEPRINT FOR GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, Vol. 1, 13 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST] (quoting NewYork
State Governor Mario Cuomo); Robert J. McCarthy, Suit Calls Judicial Selection Process a
'Sham',BUFFALO NEWS, March 19, 2004 at C1 ("[V] oters irrespective of party affiliation simply have no say in the choice for those nominated for the Office of Justice of the State
Supreme Court... and since the choice is made for them by political leaders, the voters are
unjustly disenfranchised." (quoting Kings County District Attorney CharlesJ. Hynes)).
134. See GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM,supra note 81, at 288.
135. Bernard Stamler, Bench-Pressing,Judges Can Control Your Life. Are They Up to theJob,
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1998, at A14 ("[I]t is difficult if not impossible to get an elected legislature to make selection ofjudges appointive." (quoting New York State Chief Administrative
JudgeJonathan Lippman)).
136. See, e.g,. Solimine, supra note 57; Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, September 7, 2002, at A14
("Of the 18 Civil Court judgeships up for election in New York City this November, only six
are being contested in next week's Democratic primary. As a practical matter, that means
the remaining dozen seats will be filled by men and women deeply beholden to the party
pols who gave them a berth on the democratic line and a virtually uncontested ride into
office.").

137.

RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note

133, at 16.

138. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 72, at 1220 ("[I]t is not surprising that many voters felt
uninformed and incapable of making responsible voting decisions. This undoubtedly helps
explain why, in a general election, a large number of voters do not vote on judicial candidates.").
139. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 290 ("Voter turnout repeatedly demonstrates the public's lack of interest in judicial elections.").
140. See, e.g.,
Solimine, supra note 57, at 563-64; Dann & Hansen, supra note 37, at 1430
n.10 (citing William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years ofJudicial Retention Elections
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substantial in judicial elections; voter participation in judicial elections is infinitesimal. 4 1 In 2002, there were elections for
countywide Civil Court judgeships in the following New York City
counties: New York County (Manhattan), Bronx County, Queens
County, and Kings County (Brooklyn).
In New York County, there was one open judicial slot, and only
one candidate appeared.on the ballot. 42 There are approximately
1,537,195 people who live in New York County, 1,281,455 of whom
are eighteen years of age or older (and therefore potentially eligible to vote).'43 There are 1,010,007 registered voters in New York
County (approximately 79% of the eligible population) . There
were 353,092 valid votes for Governor cast in New York County in
2002 (35% of the registered voters; 28% of those eligible to vote).
There were 186,659 valid votes cast for Civil Court judge in Manhattan (19% of the registered voters; 15% of those eligible to
vote). Did the lack of a "race" cause, or attribute to, the low voter
turnout/roll-off? Compare the data for other counties where there
was more than one candidate.
In Bronx County, there was one open judicial slot, and three
candidates appeared on the ballot. There are approximately
1,332,650 people who live in Bronx County, 939,436 of whom are
eighteen years of age or older (and therefore potentially eligible to
vote).-1 There are 663,867 registered voters in Bronx County (approximately 71% of the eligible population) . There were 189,974
valid votes for Governor cast in Bronx County in 2002 (29% of the
registered voters; 20% of those eligible to vote). There were
119,564 valid votes cast for Civil Court judge in the Bronx (18% of
the registered voters; 13% of those eligible to vote).
The winner
4 7
received 96,457 votes; 15% of the registered voters.

Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 346-47 (1987)); Andersen, supra note 69, at 1377 n.12;
McFadden, supra note 33, at 10 (citing Philip L. Dubois, Voter Turnout in State JudicialElections: An Analysis of the Tail on the Electoral Kite, 41 J. POL. 865, 865 (1979)) ("The level of

voter participation in judicial elections lags far behind participation in elections for most
executive and legislative posts."); Baum, supra note 124, at 19 ("Roll off is an enduring reality injudicial elections.").
141. See GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 290.

142. For a discussion about the prevalence of uncontested judicial elections, see supra
notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
143. See U.S. Census 2000.
144.
145.

New York State Board of Elections, November 8, 2002.
See U.S. Census 2000.

146.
147.

New York State Board of Elections, November 8, 2002.
George Villegas (D,L), the winner, received 96,457 votes. Michael Calandra (R)

received 20,798 votes, and Michael Gask (C) received 2309 votes. Id.
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In Queens County, there was one open judicial slot, and two
candidates appeared on the ballot. There are approximately
2,229,379 people who live in Queens County, 1,721,611 of whom
are eighteen years of age or older (and therefore potentially
eligible to vote).14s There are 1,038,926 registered voters in Queens
County (approximately 60% of the eligible population). 49 There
were 345,718 valid votes for Governor cast in Queens County in
2002 (33% of the registered voters; 20% of those eligible to vote).
There were 232,880 valid votes cast for Civil Court judge in
Queens (22% of the registered voters; 14% of those eligible to
vote). The
winner received 162,422 votes; 16% of the registered
50
voters.

In Kings County, there were three open slots, and seven candidates appeared on the ballot. There are approximately 2,465,326
people who live in Kings County, 1,805,709 of whom are eighteen
years of age or older (and therefore potentially eligible to vote).151
There are 1,271,743 registered voters in Kings County (approximately 70% of the eligible population). 15There were 398,536 valid
votes for Governor cast in Kings County in 2002 (31% of the registered voters; 22% of those eligible to vote). There were 746,909
valid votes cast for the three Civil Court judgeships in Brooklyn.
The winners received 200,710, 187,786, and 180,110 votes respectively; representing 16%, 15%, and 14% of the registered voters.15
Since each voter was permitted to vote for up to three candidates
to fill the three open slots, it is impossible to discern precisely how
many individuals voted for a judge. In 1982, the Fund for Modern
Courts published a study ofjudicial elections in New York State for
the years 1978, 1979 and 1980.154 Recognizing that the "calculation
of voter participation in districts with multiple vacancies ...

posed

a special problem," 155 the report's author determined that voter
participation in those situations could be best derived by "dividing
the number of votes cast by the number of vacancies in order to
148. U.S. Census 2000.
149. NewYork State Board of Elections, November 8, 2002.
150. Diccia Pineda-Kirwan (D,C,L), the winner, received 162,422 votes. Francis K.
Kenna (R) received 70,458 votes. Id.
151. U.S. Census 2000.
152. NewYork State Board of Elections, November 6, 2002.
153. The winners were Margarita Lopez Torres (D,G,WF) (200,710 votes), Delores J.
Thomas (D) (187,786 votes), and Robin S. Garson (D) (180,110 votes). Mario Romano
received 65,545 votes, James P. McCall received 53,807 votes, John Demic received 53,495
votes, and MarciaJ. Sikowitz received 5,456 votes. Id.
154. THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK (1982) (on
file with author).
155. Id. at 34.
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determine the number of 'whole ballots' cast. "15 Using that formula, approximately 20% of the registered voters cast votes for
Civil Court judge in Brooklyn.
COUNTY

%

%

%

%

REGISTERED

REGISTERED

REGISTERED

REGISTERED

VOTERS

VOTERS WHO

VOTERS WHO

VOTERS WHO

VOTED FOR

VOTED FOR

VOTED FOR

GOVERNOR

JUDGE

WINNING

35%
29%
33%
31%

19%

XXI57

18%
22%
20%

15%
16%
16%; 15%; 14%

JUDGE

79%
71%
60%
70%

New York
Bronx
Queens
Kings

The Fund for Modern Courts previously analyzed judicial elections for 1981-83.58 A comparison of the 2002 voting data with
that from 1982 reveals a precipitous decline in the percentage of
registered voters in New York City who voted for Governor, as well
1 59
as a significant decline in the number who voted for a judge.
New York County is a case in point:

YEAR

1982
2002

% REGISTERED

% REGISTERED

VOTERS WHO VOTED

VOTERS WHO VOTED

FOR GOVERNOR

FORJUDGE

66%
35%

28%
19%

2. Additional Problems with Judicial Elections-The party system
exposes judges to political pressures on the bench, for example,
when deciding politically sensitive cases.1 60 Certainly, the public
61
believes that judges' decisions are affected by politics.
156. Id.
157. There was only one candidate in the race.
158. THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK (1984) (on
file with author).
159. See Daisy Hernandez, The 2002 Elections: Turnout; After Reading the Polls, Avoiding the
PollingPlace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at B15 ("New York City registered what may be a record low in voter turnout on Tuesday, with an estimated 34.2 percent of registered voters
casting their ballots.").
160. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 286-87.
161. 81% say they believe judges' decisions are influenced by political considerations.
See PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE SURVEY, supra note 125.
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Additionally, "[c] andidates who are elected along party lines may
also feel the need to be responsive to the party establishment in
order to obtain and retain their position. ' , 62 The recent plight of
New York City Civil CourtJudge Margarita Lopez Torres is a prime
example. By all accounts she was an exemplary judgehardworking, fair, and diligent-but she apparently was denied the
party's renomination because
she declined to hire a law clerk
63
referred by party leaders.'

Many qualified, excellent potential candidates do not pursue
elected judgeships because they are not politically
connected, poS •
164
litically savvy, or interested in campaigning. 1 The qualities of a
good campaigner may be very different from those of a good
judge. 16 On the other hand, a well-qualified attorney can surface
in the New York City merit appointment process merely by having
appropriate experience-all it takes is an application. 166 That same
attorney, even if s/he can steel him/herself for a campaign and all
the trappings, cannot rise through the party apparatus without political connections.
The conflict between party politics, judicial independence, and
non-partisanship is inherent in the partisan nature of political activity and political elections. 16 As one commentator noted,
"Overall, the role of the judiciary is fundamentally at odds with the
162. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 278, 281 ("After election, the judge may
feel indebted to the party for his or her election and remain reliant on the party for
reelection."). GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 282 ("One of the most
striking problems with elective systems is that demonstrably well-qualified judges can be
denied renomination at the end of their terms because of the whims of political leaders.").
163. See, e.g., Tom Robbins, Brooklyn's Judicial Loyalty Oath, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 13,
2002, at 26 (explaining that sitting judge elected with party support denied party reendorsement for failing to hire 'politically connected law secretary). See also Cyrus R. Vance,
Remarks at New York State Conference on Improving Judicial Selection, May 6, 1988 ("In
addition to putting less than the most highly qualified individuals on the bench, the political bosses have also used the partisan election system to fire good judges because they failed
to please.") (on file with the author).
164. See, e.g., Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 14 ("Elections also discourage many wellqualified people from seeking judicial office."); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 286
("The mere requirement of participating in a contested judicial election and the necessity
of raising large amounts of cash may cause qualified candidates to opt out."); Crompton,
supranote 116, at 765..
165. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 33, at 418 ("[T]he attributes required of a good politician in a contested election may be very different from those required of an impartial
judge.").
166. That sentiment grows out of the author's experience as a member of New York
City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's Advisory Committee on the Judiciary from 1993 to 1996. See
AMERICAN JUDICATURE

SOCIETY, MERIT SELECTION: THE BEST.WAYTO

CHOOSE THE BEST

available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/msdescrip.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (emphasizing professional qualifications instead of

JUDGES,

political credentials) [hereinafter BEST WAY].
167. GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 293.
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practical implications of elective politics." 68 Political parties are
geared to reward loyalty, not merit, and to discourage, not encourage, independence. Political parties are more interested in
obtaining power than promoting justice.6 9 Even if the system was
indeed genuinely democratic, the elective system threatens judicial
independence-judges become too concerned with the popular
"will" and the impact of their rulings on re-election. 70 As a scholar
noted, "To the extent majoritarian pressures influence judicial decisions because ofjudges' electoral calculations, elective judiciaries
seem, at least at first glance, irreconcilable with 17one of the fundamental principles underlying constitutionalism.'

1

The recognition that judicial elections are fraught with problems has led to numerous proposals for reform. One common
suggestion is public financing of judicial elections. 7 ' These programs "often depend upon the willingness of taxpayers to check a
box on their tax form to contribute to the public financing fund,
and upon providing judicial candidates an incentive to accept a
small amount of public money in exchange for agreeing to campaign spending limitations." 73 Public financing is also inadequate to
deal with the rising costs of judicial campaigns that may run into the
millions. 174 In fact, the amount of funding by taxpayer contributions
has been steadily declining.175 Additionally, public financing has no
impact on independent spending by special interest groups and
168. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 277, 287. ("The heart of the problem with
judicial elections is that the popular election of judges is fundamentally at odds with the
concept of an impartial judiciary.").
169. GOVERNMENT ETHICS REvORM, supranote 81, at 293.

170. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 277 ("[E]lections threaten judicial
independence by pressuring judges to follow the will of the majority, which may run
counter to the rule of law."); Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 14 ("Elections ... compromise
the independence of the judiciary....").
171. Croley, supranote 1, at 696-97.
172. See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 1, at 892 n.225 ("Public funding seems especially
suitable, for several reasons, for judicial elections."); Call to Action, supra note 3, at 1358;
ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS REPORT 29 (July 23, 2001); Leander Shaw, Jr., Florida'sJudicial

Merit Selection and Retention System: The Better Alternative, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 283, 286
(1992) ("Perhaps public financing ofjudicial campaigns is an idea whose time has come.").
See generally Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly FinancedJudicialElections: An Overview, 34 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 1467 (2001).
173. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 296-97. See also Deborah Goldberg, Public
FundingofJudicial Elections: The Role ofJudges and the Rules of Campaign Finance,64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 95, 111 (2003) (noting that existing public financing options for other political
branches may not work well for the judiciary, and that public funding is a viable solution
"only if the vast majority of candidates for the bench participate in the program").
174. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 297.
175. See, e.g., Mathias, supra note 38, at 46.
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might serve to increase their impact on judicial elections. 76 Finally,
some are concerned that public financing encourages "marginally
1 77
committed or qualified candidates to run at public expense.'
Judicial election reformers also suggest that campaign contribution limits may ameliorate some of the problems associated with
judicial elections.178 But contribution limits add pressure on judicial candidates to solicit from individual attorneys who appear
before them, require judicial candidates to spend more time raising money, and give more power to those wealthy enough to
finance their own campaigns. 17
Others posit that nonpartisan elections will help remove the influence of party leaders on judicial elections.' 0 The switch to
nonpartisan elections, however, has seemingly had no impact on
the increasingly huge amounts of money spent on judicial campaigns, and it is apparent that political parties will continue to
impact the campaign whether or not listed on the ballot.' Still
others have suggested that party labels provide voters with at least
some information regarding the candidates. 2
In general, tinkering with, or "reforming," judicial elections is
not the answer; it is ultimately a futile endeavor. The problems regarding the public's trust and confidence in elected courts will
remain, as will the many other problems endemic to elections.8 3 In
176. Behrens & Silverman, supranote 31, at 297; Finley, supra note 125, at 69; Geyh, supra note 172, at 1479-80.
177. Mathias, supranote 38, at 46.
178. See, e.g., Call to Action, supra note 3, at 1358; Press Release, ABA, American Bar Association Changes Model Judicial Ethics Rules to Reform Campaign Funding (Aug. 24,
1999) (regarding the ABA House of Delegates amending the Code of Judicial Conduct to
limit judicial campaign contributions); Roy Schotland, Perspectives on Judicial Independence:
ProposedLegislation on JudicialElection CampaignFinance,64 OHIO ST. L.J. 127 (2003) (urging
adoption of aggregated contribution limits).
179. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 297.
180. See, e.g., Samuel Latham Grimes, Without Favor,Denial, or Delay: Will North Carolina
Finally Adopt the Merit Selection ofJudges?, 76 N.C. L. REV.2266, 2299 (1998) ("[T]he switch to
nonpartisan elections could help combat the growing political nature of judgeships by reducing the role of partisanship in judicial elections."); Noe, supra note 114, at 240
(explaining that nonpartisan elections would be "a positive step toward removing politics
from judicial campaigns"); Call to Action, supra note 3, at 1355.
181. See, e.g.,
Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 298; GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 293; Finley, supra note 125, at 69; Averill, supra note 81, at 322
("[N]onpartisan elections are often so in name only ...").
182. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 298; Averill, supranote 81, at 322
(explaining that party labels provide at least some reference points); Maute, supra note 72,
at 1204. For details regarding voters' lack of knowledge about judicial candidates, see supra
notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Reddick, supra note 106, at 6 ("[R]eforms, such as public financing of
elections, campaign contribution limits, and moving from partisan to nonpartisan elections,
have all proven to have fundamental flaws in their ability to make a judiciary appear independent and impartial."); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 276 ("Campaign finance
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addition, the present post-Wite landscape, and the prospect of increasingly contentious judicial campaigns, dictate that we cease
and desist from electing judges.
III.

MODEL MERIT SELECTION PROCESS

Many believe that the best, or only, way to promote ans
4
independent judiciary is to abandon judicial elections.
Interestingly, while some recoil from the prospect of switching
from elective to appointive systems, the idea of changing from
appointive to elective processes, for example by electing federal
judges, seems "unthinkable."18 5 In fact, the elimination of politics

from the process and the preservation of judicial independence
were among the reasons why New York State changed to a merit
selection process for the judges on the Court of Appeals, its
highest court.1"6 Commentators have suggested that "momentum is
building in this country for adoption of appointive judicial
selection systems.",8 7 In fact, there is longstanding, extensive, and

widespread support for merit selection in New York State.

8

The

reform and tinkering with judicial codes of conduct to regulate speech in judicial campaigns do not offer a comprehensive solution to the systemic problems inherent in judicial
elections. Such changes not only face significant constitutional hurdles, but also come with
their own set of problems."); Schofland, supra note 178 ("[S]ome people dismiss these
kinds of advances as 'bandaids.'").
184. See, e.g., Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case forJudicial Appointments, 22 U. TOL.
L. REv. 353, 355 (2002) (arguing that if one accepts the need for an independent judiciary,
then the best selection method is appointment, not election); Hanssen, supra note 71.
185. Croley, supra note 1, at 696.
186. George Bundy Smith, ChoosingJudgesfor a State's Highest Court, 48 SYR. L. REv. 1493
(1998). Not coincidentally, in short order, the court added its first woman and became increasingly diverse. Id.
187. Behrens & Silverman, supra note 31, at 276; Nicole C. Allbritain, Noble Lies and the
FirstAmendment: A Symposium on the Death of Discourse, Comment, One Step Closer to Merit-Based
Judicial Selection: Ohio's New Limitations onJudicial Campaign Contributionsand Expenditures,64
U. CIN. L. REv. 1323, 1330 (1996) ("[Mlany states are in the process of revising theirjudicial
systems to include merit selection."); GOVERNMENT ETlics REFORM, supra note 81, at n.69
("The nationwide trend is unmistakably toward appointive systems."); Goldschmidt, supra
note 61, at 2 (arguing that the merit plan has gained widespread acceptance); But see Selection of State Judges Symposium, Transcripts,JudicialElections and Campaign FinanceReform, 22 U.
TOL. L. REv. 335, 340 (2002) (quoting panelist Roy Schotiand, "We are not going to get rid
ofjudicial elections."); Geyh, supra note 29, at 56 (stating that the merit selection movement
is moribund).
188. See, e.g., THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY (1991);
THE STATE-CITY COMMISSION ON INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT (1986). Gary Spencer, State

Bar Backs Bench Merit Selection, N.YL.J., Apr. 6, 1993, at 1 ("Hoping to improve the quality of
... judges ... the New York State Bar Association ... endorsed a new merit selection plan
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Fund for Modern Courts surveyed candidates for the New York
State legislature in 2002 regarding several court reform issues."s9
56% of the respondents favored merit selection for the judiciary,
while only 34% favored judicial elections.' 90 This represented
increased support for merit selection from that reflected in
Modern Courts's 2000 survey of legislative candidates.19 A majority
of respondents also agreed that merit selection was more likely to
promote judicial independence and impartiality.' 92 Modern
for trial court judgeships."); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (ABCNY),
Report of the Special Committee on the Constitutional Convention: Selection ofJudges, Mar. 1967, at 1
("The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has, for nearly a decade, supported
efforts to change the present elective system.") The report goes on to cite the efforts of the
bar association, dating back to 1873, to discontinue the elective system. Id. Evan Davis, President's Column 44TH STREET NOTES, Apr. 2002 ("For many years the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York has opposed the election of judges.")). Mario M. Cuomo, Some
Thoughts on JudicialIndependence, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 298, 304 (1997) (explaining that merit
selection "is our highest form of judicial selection. It focuses on qualifications, not connections; on intelligence, not ideology. The Court of Appeals is chosen that way. I would prefer
if all our judges were chosen that way."); Governor Hugh Carey was a primary force in the
switch from election to merit selection forjudges on the Court of Appeals, and supported
merit selection for all of New York's judges. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
1976, at Al (reporting that Governor Carey proposed that all judges of the unified court
system be appointed along merit selection lines); Richard J. Meislin, A Tough '81 Session
Looming in Albany, N.Y Times, Jan. 5, 1981, at Al ("Mr. Carey is also expected to repeat his
call for ... appointment, rather than election, of many judges."). Press Release, Sol
Wachtler, State of the Judiciary (Apr. 22, 1985) ("I believe that the merit selection process
which, before the end of this month, will have been responsible for selecting the entire
judicial complement of our Court of Appeals, is the best method of selecting judges.");
CharlesJ. Breitel, Improving Our New York Courts, 46 N.Y. ST. BARJ. 232 (June 1974) ("The
elective process, instituted to make government responsive to the People, to influence the
enactment of laws and the support of programs in accordance with the popular will, is inappropriate to selection for judicial office."). See, e.g., Richard Perez-Pena, ChiefJudge Names
Administratorfor Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1993, at B6 ("Justice Milonas ... proposed that
the election ofjudges be eliminated."). The current Chief Administrator, Matthew T Crosson, supported "replacing judicial elections with an appointive merit selection system." Id.
The media has also expressed substantial support for merit selection. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2003, at A34 ("[T] he clear answer is to take judges out of the elective process
altogether and have them appointed through a strict screening procedure based on
merit"); Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A14 (suggesting ways to improve judicial
elections but asserting the long-term goal of replacing elections with a merit selection system); Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2002, atA14 ("[S]tates should consider switching from
elections to merit selection."); Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996, at A14 (imploring the
Governor to "press the State Legislature to change to a nonpartisan system of merit selection").
189. The survey asked questions regarding judicial selection, court restructuring, the
so-called Rockefeller drug laws, cameras in the courts, and the fees paid to counsel assigned
to represent the indigent in Criminal and Family Courts.
190. The candidates were asked, "Do you support the appointment ofjudges from a list
of well-qualified candidates screened by a bipartisan nominating committee, as opposed to
the election ofjudges in partisan campaigns?"
191. In 2000, 49% favored merit selection.
192. Respondents were asked, "Which method of judicial selection do you believe best
preserves the independent and impartial administration of justice?"
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of New York City
Courts's 2001 survey of all candidates for Mayor
3
selection.1
merit
for
support
found unanimous
What, then, should a model merit selection process look like?
What are the component parts of an ideal system of merit selection? At the outset, it is necessary to grapple with the means
employed to enact the system. In general terms, changes in a
state's system of judicial selection can be achieved through Executive Order, statute, or constitutional amendment. A more
permanent change would be the result of a constitutional amendment. Such an amendment would also provide more credibility
and legitimacy to the reform. Executive Orders or statutes can too
easily be rescinded by the next chief executive or legislature.
Perhaps the key to any merit selection system is the Nominating
Commission. There are two primary issues concerning the
duties.
The
and
Commission--composition
Nominating
Commission members must be appointed on a nonpartisan, or
bipartisan, basis, from numerous sources and by multiple
authorities.194 They should serve staggered terms of service with term
limits to prevent individuals or small groups from becoming too
influential or entrenched. To address minority concerns about merit
selection, and to ensure that the Commission will recommend the
best possible judicial candidates, it is especially critical that
Commission members truly reflect diversity.9 5 In much the same
way that a diverse bench is imbued with greater legitimacy by
virtue of more accurately resembling the population it serves, so
too will the Nominating Commission benefit from diversity. A
diverse Nominating Commission will not necessarily recommend a
193.

Survey results on file with author.

194.

See, e.g., Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Searchfor Fairness, In-

dependence and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 673 (2001) (arguing that the
nominating commission must be nonpartisan and free from political pressure). It is similarly imperative that the ultimate nominating authority not have the power to select a
majority of the commission's members.
Webster, supra note 68, at 32 ("To have any hope of achieving its asserted
195. See, e.g.,
goals, such a [merit selection] plan must be based .upon provisions which ensure a truly

independent, impartial, and diverse commission, with the power and resources to investigate thoroughly those who come before it. as candidates."). In 1994,. the American
Judicature Society, the foremost civic organization devoted to replacing judicial elections
with merit selection, amended its Model Judicial Selection Provisions to provide that "[a]ll
appointing authorities shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the commission substantially reflects the gender, ethnic and racial diversity of the jurisdiction." AMERICAN

(1984, revised 1994) [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS]; Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 67 ("There is a nationwide
trend to address the lack of diversity on the bench by explicitly adding racial and gender
diversity as a criterion for the selection of both nominating commissioners and judicial
appointees.").

JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS
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diverse slate of candidates. Yet, the more the Commission has
people with different backgrounds, experiences, and points of
view, the more likely it is to produce a representative and high
quality judiciary. Similarly, to address the criticism that merit
selection is lawyer-driven and elitist, the Commission should have a
significant non-lawyer presence. Indeed, some have suggested
making laypersons a supermajority. 96 Other important issues
relating to the composition of the Commission include the size of
the Commission and the number of Commissions to establish in a
particular jurisdiction.

The Commission's duties should include identifying, recruiting,
interviewing, evaluating, and, ultimately, recommending candidates to the appointing authority. A stated goal must be to
promote diversity on the bench. The Commission should submit a
list of between two and five nominees per vacancy to the appointing authority, and s/he must make the appointment from that list
within a prescribed time period. 97 The list of nominees should be
made public to encourage public comment prior to the appointment. It is imperative that the Commission's independence from
the appointing authority be preserved and protected.
Finally, the designated executive, also guided by a diversity
mandate, must make his/her appointment from the Commission's
list within the specified time frame.'9
Retention elections have been a part of many merit selection
systems. 99 These entail an uncontested election where the sole
question put to the voters is whether the judge should remain in
office. The election should take place after the judge has been in
office long enough for voters to assess actual performance. State-

196. See, e.g., Kelley Armitage, DenialAin'tJust a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review ofJudicial Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of StateJudges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REv.625,655-56
(2002) (decrying the domination of nominating commissions by lawyers, and urging that
lay members comprise a supermajority of all commissions).
197. See MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 195. The goal is to give the appointing authority a real choice while also limiting his/her appointing power. Id.
198. Many merit selection systems also include some sort of legislative confirmation.
199. Pelander, supra note 36, at 647 ("Retention elections are an integral aspect of
merit selection."); Armitage, supra note 196, at 649 ("When wedded to retention elections,
merit selection 'was a practical compromise between the goals of judicial independence
and public accountability. The combined system of initial merit selection and subsequent
retention elections was designed to obtain quality judges, maintain their independence by
insulating them from political influences, and provide public accountability through a
mechanism for removal of judges."' (quoting Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention
Elections andJudicialBehavior,77JUDICATURE 306, 306-7 (1994) (citations omitted))).
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sponsored and funded judicial performance evaluations/reviews
and/or voters' guides should be used to educate the voters.2 00
The motivation for retention elections is to confront the criticism that merit selection is antithetical to judicial accountability,
democracy, and the public's right to be heard. 20 ' But many argue
that the threat retention elections pose to judicial independence
outweighs any purported benefit.202 Scholars have detailed the
price paid by sitting judges in retention elections when they were
characterized as "soft on crime."20 Retention elections also open
the door for other sorts of organized anti-incumbent campaigning
as, for example, when business interests unite to remove ajudge. °4
In short, retention elections are becoming increasingly expensive
and nasty, thereby putting greater demands on sitting judges'
time.0 5 In lieu of a retention election, states should employ a reappointment process that begins as a judge's term nears completion.
The Nominating Commission, aided by judicial performance
evaluations/reviews, recommends to the appointing authority
whether or not to reappoint.
Why merit selection? While it is impossible to entirely remove
politics from the equation, merit systems remove political

200. For more regarding judicial performance evaluation devices, see supra notes 6970. For more regarding voters' guides, see supra note 38.
201. See, e.g., Dann & Hansen, supra note 37; Pelander, supra note 36. Others see retention elections as a sop to those who insist that elections must somehow play a role in judicial
Geyh, supra note 29, at 55 (arguing that retention elections are "a conceselections. See, e.g.,
sion to the entrenched political necessity of preservingjudicial elections in some form").
202. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 194, at 672.
203. See, e.g., Carrington supra note 120, at 110 (discussing how incumbent Judge Penny
White of Tennessee lost her retention election because a campaign against her focused on one
decision overturning a death sentence). Carrington observes that generally ajudge's criminal
law and capital punishment decisions will serve as "lightning rods" in a retention election. Id.
Carrington also notes that the Governor of Tennessee at the time thought White sent an
appropriate message to judges that when deciding cases they should look over their shoulders to see how their decisions will play at the polls. Id. See also Stephen B. Bright, Judicial
Review and JudicialIndependence: CanJudicialIndependence be Attained in the South? Overcoming
History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV.817
(1998).
Schotland, supra note 1, at 866-67 ("Since at least the early 1990s, Ala204. See, e.g.,
bama, which for better or worse has led the nation in punitive damages awards, has seen
constant hot contests between Democratic candidates supported by plaintiffs' trial lawyers
and Republican candidates supported by business interests.... For a while, Texas Supreme
Court elections were a battleground between liberal Democrats supported largely by plaintiffs' trial lawyers and Republicans and conservative Democrats supported by business
interests.").
205. Even though there is no opponent, retention elections have still proven to be
costly, and are getting costlier as judges strive to protect themselves from interest groups
who target them for decisions they oppose. Finley, supra note 125, at 61.
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considerations from judicial selection as much as possible.0 6 Merit
selection is not a panacea. But it is undeniably less overtly political
and better suited to preserve the integrity of,20

and to increase

public trust and confidence in, the judiciary.0 s It is a process issue.
As noted in one study, "A properly designed appointive system will
take power out of the hands of unaccountable party bosses and
give it to elected public officials accountable to the voters for their
decisions.",2 9 It may also yield greater diversity2 0 and a better
caliber ofjudge. 21 At a minimum, it removes the real, potential, or
perceived influence of party leaders, fundraising, and political
campaigning, and "the inherently partisan nature of political party
activity. 2 1 2 For many, that is enough to merit making the switch.

"What our investigation has shown is that elective systems are so
infused with party politics that they do not and cannot protect the
independence of the judiciary and promote the broadest possible
access to the bench, and that the threat to public confidence
alone
23
requires New York State to adopt less partisan alternatives., '

CONCLUSION

Judicial selection, the way we pick our judges, is taking on
greater prominence. Judicial campaigns are becoming costlier and
nastier as judicial elections become indistinguishable from any
206.

RESTORING

THE

PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 133, at 16 ("Politics cannot be banished

altogether from judicial selection, whether under an elective or appointive system.");
GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 274 ("Nor do we believe that politics can be

banished completely from the selection of judges."); Goldschmidt, supra note 61, at 78
("Politics has not been eradicated under merit selection, but it has been greatly
minimized."); BEST WAY, supra note 166 (explaining that merit selection does not ensure
the "total elimination of politics" from judicial selection, but it does "minimize political
influence"). Some argue that merit selection is even more political than elections. See, e.g.,
Maute, supra note 72; Donald C. Wintersheimer, Judicial Independence Through Popular
Election, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 791 (2001).
207. See, e.g., Reddick, supra note 59; Crompton, supra note 116 (arguing that merit selection is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judiciary).
208. See, e.g., Reddick, supra note 59 (suggesting use of impact on public trust and confidence in the courts as the key criterion for judging judicial selection systems and
concluding that merit selection is preferable on that measure); Goldschmidt, supra note 61,
at 4 (explaining that merit selection is "not a panacea that would completely eliminate politics from judicial selection, [but] is a far preferable system ... than [sic] the electoral
process").
209.

RESTORING

210.
211.
212.
213.

See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM, supra note 81, at 273.
Id. at 274.

THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 133, at 16.
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other elections. The Supreme Court's decision in White, paving the
way for more judicial campaign speech, only adds fuel to the fire.
In New York, the situation is even more dire. Scandals on the
Brooklyn bench have prompted the District Attorney to convene a
Grand Jury to investigate, inter alia, the way judges are selected in
that borough, and the District Court's decision in Spargo generated
much consternation and litigation.
It is time to reconsider the merits of merit selection and to
compare that system to judicial elections. This Article informs the
debate by examining the two processes and the hard data regarding the judges yielded by each method.
Why have judicial elections? Its proponents aver that elections
encourage citizen participation in their judiciary and promote accountability by making judges beholden to the electorate. An
examination of voting behavior raises questions about those
propositions. Roll-off, the reduction in numbers of those who vote
for candidates in the major races (i.e., Governor) but not for a
judge, is profound. While apathy exists in elections for even the
highest offices, it is even more evident in judicial elections. Very
few people actually vote for a judicial candidate. So much for the
goal of fostering democracy and civic participation. Rather than
making judges accountable to the citizenry, it appears that elections simply vest almost absolute power in the hands of political
party leaders. The result is that the judiciary remains one of the
last bastions of pure political patronage.
If nobody votes, then why continue to subject judges to having
to raise cash from, inevitably, the lawyers who appear in front of
them, or from special interests that may have cases come across the
judge's docket? It cannot come as a surprise that polls consistently
show that the public believes elected judges are beholden to their
campaign contributors. Why continue to have campaigns that
seem to encourage judges to engage in bitter campaigning, and to
publicly assert their views on a variety of legal or political issues?
The result has been, and will continue to be, an erosion of public
trust and confidence in the judiciary.
There is still more ammunition against judicial elections. A
quarter of a century of data from the New York City judiciary reveals that elected judges are significantly more likely to be
disciplined for judicial misconduct than their appointed counterparts. Could it be the case that political designees are picked more
for their political bona fides than their qualifications? While both
elections and appointments in New York have produced more
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women and judges of color in the last decade than in previous
years, it is clearly the case that minorities fared much better in the
elective system. Yet, a deeper analysis reveals that that result is limited to New York City. An examination of the statewide elected
judiciary reveals an astonishing lack of judges of color. Outside
New York City, it seems well nigh impossible for a person of color
to be elected to the bench in New York State.
The solution is merit selection. The structure of the component
parts of the merit selection system is critical. There must be a diverse, non- or bipartisan nominating commission with a substantial
presence of nonlawyers. The commission should be guided by a
diversity mandate to help ensure that the bench better mirrors the
population it serves and should recommend only a limited number of candidates to the appointing authority. The appointer must
then be constrained to make his/her selection from the list received from the nominating commission. A perfect system? No.
Better than elections? Yes, and more likely to produce a truly
"qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary."

